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1. INTRODUCTION
Israel’s security challenges are manifold, complex, and
existential. The country has been at war with every State on its
borders–Syria, Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon–at least once since its
establishment in 1948.1 More distant foes, including Iran, continue
to directly or indirectly support non-State organized armed groups
that seek its destruction and, in some cases, the creation of a
Palestinian State.2 Two of these, Hezbollah and Hamas, field forces
that are especially well organized and equipped.3
Over the years, the Israel Defense Forces (“IDF”) have launched
thousands of strikes against their enemies. Some have been isolated
surgical attacks, whereas others have been integral components of
major military campaigns. Human rights organizations have often
criticized the operations on the basis of the law of armed conflict
(“LOAC”), also known as international humanitarian law or the law
of war.4 Such criticism raises the question of whether the IDF
1 See generally Ian J. Bickerton & Karrla L. Clausner, A History of the ArabIsraeli Conflict (6th ed. 2010) (describing the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict);
Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (2009).
2 See YAAKOV KATZ & YOAZ HENDEL, ISRAEL VS. IRAN: THE SHADOW WAR 4 (1st
ed. 2012) (overviewing Iran’s support of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the
Gaza Strip); Carol J. Williams, Iranian Officials Say They Have Armed Hamas for Fight
With Israel, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/world/
middleeast/la-fg-israel-gaza-hamas-iran-20140804-story.html (explaining the
material support Hamas receives from Iran).
3 See Jeffrey D. Feltman & Daniel Benjamin, Assessing the Strength of Hizballah,
U.S. DEP’T ST. (June 8, 2010), http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/142857.htm
(warning of Hezbollah’s weapons and hostility as a threat to peace); Jeffrey White,
The Combat Performance of Hamas in the Gaza War of 2014, CTC SENTINEL (Sept. 2014),
available at https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-combat-performance-of-hamasin-the-gaza-war-of-2014 (explaining the growing threat that Hamas constitutes as
the result of its new tactics).
4 See, e.g., Families Under the Rubble: Israeli Attacks on Inhabited Homes, AMNESTY
INT’L 37–42 (Nov. 5, 2014), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/
MDE15/032/2014/en/ (describing Amnesty International’s views that the
targeting of family homes by Israeli air strikes during Operation Protective Edge
was a violation of international humanitarian law); Israel: In-Depth Look at Gaza
(Sept.
11,
2014),
School
Attacks,
HUM.
RTS.
WATCH
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/
11/israel-depth-look-gaza-school-attacks (detailing three separate attacks on
school housing in the Gaza Strip which Human Rights Watch considers to violate
international law); Jutta Bachmann et al., Gaza, 2014: Findings of an Independent
Medical Fact-finding Mission, PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS-ISRAEL 98–99 (2014),
https://gazahealthattack.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/gazareport_eng.pdf
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systems and processes for engaging in attacks promote compliance
with the LOAC. Moreover, it raises concerns regarding the legal
standards that the IDF apply.
This article examines both issues. The findings set forth herein
are derived in great part from a December 2014 research trip to Israel
by the Authors and from a second visit by one of them in February
2015. The IDF granted them unprecedented access that included a
“staff ride” of the Gaza area, inspection of an Israeli operations
center responsible for overseeing combat operations, a visit to a
Hamas infiltration tunnel, review of IDF doctrine and other
targeting guidance, and briefings by IDF operators and legal
personnel who have participated in targeting. The Authors also
conducted extensive interviews of senior IDF commanders and key
IDF legal advisers.5
Although the approach might be perceived as leading to a proIsraeli bias, the sole purpose of the project was to examine Israeli
targeting systems, processes, and norms in the abstract; no attempt
was made to assess targeting during any particular conflict or the
legality of individual attacks. With respect to the resulting
(analyzing the results of the Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip from a medical
standpoint and finding the results indicative of violations of international
humanitarian and human rights laws); Nothing is Immune: Israel’s Destruction of
Landmark Buildings in Gaza, AMNESTY INT’L. 21–25 (Dec. 9, 2014),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/ documents/mde15/0029/2014/en/ (finding the
destruction of civilian buildings by the IDF to be, under the opinion of Amnesty
International, a war crime); Precisely Wrong: Gaza Civilians Killed by Israeli DroneLaunched
Missiles,
HUM.
RTS.
WATCH
(June
30,
2009),
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/06/30/precisely-wrong-0
(presenting
evidence about six drone attacks carried out by Israel that resulted in civilian
injuries and deaths and recommending Israel begin an independent inquiry into its
use of aerial drones); Rain of Fire: Israel’s Unlawful Use of White Phosphorus in Gaza,
HUM.
RTS.
WATCH
(Mar.
25,
2009),
http://www.hrw.
org/reports/2009/03/25/rain-fire (listing six instances of the use of white
phosphorus weapons by the IDF in populated areas of Gaza and recommending
investigation of the IDF’s use of white phosphorus based on Human Rights Watch’s
opinion that it was being used in a manner that violates the law of armed combat;)
White Flag Deaths: Killings of Palestinian Civilians during Operation Cast Lead, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (Aug. 13, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/08/13/whiteflag-deaths-0 (outlining seven examples of Israeli soldiers attacking and killing
civilians during “Operation Cast Lead” and criticizing Israel for its failure to
investigate these occurrences, as it is obligated to do by international law).
5 Much of the material in this article is based directly on the interviews with
members of the IDF and other Israeli government agencies; individual interviewees
are not identified. Additionally, the Authors draw on their own personal
experience and training for much of the background material on military operations
and law.
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observations and conclusions, note that the Authors combine
extensive academic and operational experience vis-à-vis targeting
and therefore were in a unique position to assess the credibility and
viability of Israeli assertions.6 The result was a highly granular and
exceptionally frank dialogue.
The article is in four parts. Part I describes the unique
operational environment in which Israeli forces engage in targeting
operations. As every conflict is different, it is essential to
understand the operational environment before assessing the extent
to which targeting systems and processes facilitate LOAC
compliance. Moreover, although LOAC norms are not conflict
specific, the operational environment influences the legal issues that
arise during an armed conflict.
In Part II, the targeting process itself is surveyed. This process
is determined in great part by the operational environment
described in the previous Part. Discussion focuses on how the IDF
organize for, and engage in, operations involving attacks on enemy
forces. As they differ significantly, ground and air targeting systems
are scrutinized separately.
Part III narrows the focus by examining those aspects of the
Military Advocate General Corps’ (MAG) organization,
responsibilities, and activities that are relevant to the issue of Israeli
targeting. As will become clear, legal advisors, including the
Military Advocate General himself, comprise an integral facet of the
process by which IDF operations unfold.
Israeli positions on the LOAC are surveyed in Part IV. Treaty
and customary norms that govern targeting are set forth, as well as
Israel views as to how they apply to its operations. Some of the
norms are the subject of international and scholarly disagreement
regarding their precise contours and interpretation. To the extent
that the IDF representatives were willing to discuss them, Part IV
sets forth the Israeli positions on these matters, together with the
Authors’ assessment of those positions. The article concludes with
a general assessment of Israeli targeting.

6 One author is a retired U.S. Air Force targeting officer and judge advocate,
the other an active duty Army judge advocate with extensive experience in
targeting in current conflicts. Both have also addressed targeting from an academic
perspective.
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2. OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
In his masterpiece of military theory, Carl von Clausewitz
observed that all war is inherently an interaction: “it is not the action
of a living force upon a lifeless mass . . . but always the collision of
two living forces.”7 This interaction between adversaries, as well as
the characteristics of the wider strategic environment in which a
conflict occurs, impacts the relative values placed by each adversary
on particular political and military objectives and, accordingly, the
manner in which combat operations are conducted to achieve them.8
Simply put, the operating environment at the tactical, operational,
and strategic levels of war determines how wars will be fought.
Like any military force, the IDF’s organization, doctrine, and
capabilities are adapted to deal with the specific security challenges
posed by the operational environment in which it finds itself.9 That
environment includes the political objectives and military
wherewithal of both Israel and its adversaries. This Part highlights
those aspects of the operating environment that most directly
influence IDF targeting processes and Israeli views on the LOAC. It
addresses how Israel has organized to confront the threat it
perceives, as well as how Israel’s adversaries seek to exploit the
operational environment in an effort to neutralize Israeli strengths
and create favorable asymmetries.
2.1. Israel and the IDF

7 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 77 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret, eds.,
trans. 1984).
8 See id. at 602 (positing that “the nature of the political aim, the scale of
demands put forward by either side, and the total political situation of one's own
side are all factors that in practice must decisively influence the conduct of war.”).
9 See, e.g., DAVID E. JOHNSON, MILITARY CAPABILITIES FOR HYBRID WAR: INSIGHTS
FROM THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES IN LEBANON AND GAZA 6 (RAND Corp. 2010)
(describing how Israel adapted its doctrine and training following the 2nd Lebanon
War in 2006). See also Raphael D. Marcus, Military Innovation and Tactical Adaptation
in the Israel-Hizballah Conflict: The Institutionalization of Lesson-Learning in the IDF, 38
J. STRATEGIC STUD. 500, 506 (2014) (regarding the Israeli lessons learned process).
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The single most important facet of warfare from Israel’s
perspective is the proximity of the threat. Israel is a small country—
a mere 263 miles from north to south and an average of only 45 miles
from east to west. At its narrowest point, the distance from the West
Bank to the sea is 9.3 miles. Within this territory live more than eight
million Israelis, spread between major cities like Tel Aviv,
Jerusalem, and Haifa and hundreds of villages and towns.10
The Gaza Strip lies on the western edge of the country, bordered
by Egypt and the Mediterranean Sea. Hamas, which has been in
control of the area since 2007, launched rockets to distances of up to
93 miles during its 2014 conflict with Israel, a range that
encompasses all of the country’s major population centers.11 The
rocket campaign was intense. Between July 8 and August 6, 3,360
rockets were launched, 2,303 of which struck Israel.12 To the north,
Hezbollah, supported by Iran, operates freely in southern Lebanon,
thereby also bringing much of Israel within rocket range.13 The
rocket threat from these two areas is presently the most significant
threat to Israel.

10 Israel
2008,
CIA
WORLD
FACT
BOOK
(Dec.
15,
2015),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/is.html.
11 Open-source reporting on Hamas rocket capabilities and ranges, including
maps depicting range circles, are available. See, e.g., Joe Burgess & Karen Yourish,
The Growing Reach of Hamas’s Rockets, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/07/13/world/middleeast/thegrowing-reach-of-hamas-rockets.html?_r=0 (depicting the past and current range
of Hamas’s rocket weaponry); HAMAS Rockets, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG (Apr. 09,
2014), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hamas-qassam.htm
(reporting that the Khaibar-1 M302 rocket can launch a 375-pound warhead as far
as 125 miles).
12 Operation Protective Edge by the Numbers, THE OFFICIAL BLOG OF THE ISRAEL
http://www.idfblog.com/blog/2014/08/05/
DEF. FORCES (Aug. 5, 2014),
operation-protective-edge-numbers/ [hereinafter By The Numbers].
13 See generally Patrick Devenny, Hezbollah’s Strategic Threat to Israel, 13 MIDDLE
E. Q. 31, 31–38 (2006) (demonstrating the capacity and reach of Hezbollah’s
operational artillery).
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Figure 1: Rocket Threat to Israel14

On the northeastern border, the contested Golan Heights, seized
by Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War, provide a buffer between Israel
and Syria; control of this strategically vital highland would allow an
adversary to launch artillery at the Israeli lowlands and offer an
avenue of attack into Israel’s heartland.15 While the peace between
Israel and Egypt and Jordan, respectively, appears stable, the
occupied West Bank that Israel seized from Jordon in 1967 is a
source of continuing unrest. It presents a constant low-grade
military threat extending to the edge of Jerusalem. Much of the West
Bank is under the generally ineffective administrative and security
authority of the Palestinian National Authority.
Further
complicating Israel’s security situations are the Israeli settlements
sprinkled throughout the West Bank, an area over which Israel
exercises fragile military control.

14 Map prepared by Graphic Department, U.S. Naval War College, based on
data from open sources.
15 See generally ANTHONY CORDESMAN, PERILOUS PROSPECTS: THE ARAB-ISRAELI
MILITARY BALANCE AND THE PEACE PROCESS 228–240 (1995), available at http://csis.
org/publication/perilous-prospects-arab-israeli-military-balance-and-peaceprocess (discussing the strategic importance of the Golan Heights).
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As a consequence of its geography and the nature of the threat
environment, the IDF is not an expeditionary force. Unlike the
United States, which relies on the forward presence of a standing
force operating globally to confront threats far from its homeland,
the IDF is configured to mobilize rapidly and frequently in order to
deter and defeat threats on its immediate borders. Of particular
concern in terms of framing military strategies and tactics is the fact
that Israel enjoys no strategic depth;16 there is literally nowhere to
which the IDF may retreat. When Israeli soldiers fight, they do so
within minutes, and sometimes within view, of their homes.
Israel’s small size and proximity to Gaza, Southern Lebanon,
and Syria do, however, afford it the advantage of what practitioners
of operational art refer to as an “interior position.”17 Put simply,
while being surrounded certainly creates pressing problems for a
military strategist, it also has the virtue of enabling one to
concentrate forces quickly and maneuver them in any direction the
situation may warrant. Combat aircraft launched from anywhere in
the country can be over Gaza or southern Lebanon in minutes,
thereby affording the Israeli Air Force exceptional flexibility,
reaction time, and loiter capability. In a relative sense, the same is
true for the ground and naval forces. Moreover, ground and air
assets can be quickly re-tasked to strike elsewhere as the battle
situation unfolds and evolves.
These factors affect the IDF’s organization, doctrine, and ethos.
Their influence on the roles and missions of the Air Force and
Ground Forces is particularly marked. The Air Force is Israel’s
strategic arm and controls all fixed wing aircraft, rotary aviation,
and remotely piloted aircraft (“RPA,” the so-called “drones”); in
contrast to the armies and navies of many other countries, their IDF

16 The term “strategic depth” generally refers to that part of the defenses of
territory that lies beyond the immediate operational reach of the adversary; this
translates into to the ability to trade space for time when defending. MILAN VEGO,
JOINT OPERATIONAL WARFARE: THEORY AND PRACTICE GL–19 (2007) (Newport, RI:
Naval War College, reprint 2009). The lack of strategic depth has long figured
prominently in Israeli strategic doctrine. See, e.g., YOAV BEN-HORIN & BARRY POSEN,
ISRAEL’S STRATEGIC DOCTRINE, 26–27 (RAND Corp. 1981) (describing Israel’s
previous considerations of defensible borders which included the goal of creating
borders that would provide a margin of safety and allow more flexibility of
response).
17 VEGO, supra note 16, at IV–52.
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counterparts possess no aviation capabilities.18 Thus, only the Air
Force can reach distant strategic targets such as the Iraqi Osirak
nuclear facility the IDF attacked in 198119 and the Syrian nuclear
facility struck in 2007.20 In addition to their far greater reach, air
assets by their very nature are highly flexible tools in terms of
reacting rapidly to a dynamic battlefield, may be easily repositioned,
can confront threats from any direction, and can engage targets with
great precision. Moreover, when an air force enjoys air superiority,
as does the Israeli Air Force, employing air power often poses less
of a risk to those conducting an attack than in the case of ground
forces. Accordingly, Israel relies heavily on the Air Force to target
adversaries in Gaza, Lebanon, and other areas close to its borders.
The strategic role of the Israeli Air Force, when combined with
its responsibility for simultaneously conducting theater level strikes
and supporting ground operations, warrants a high degree of
centralized control. Ordinarily such control comes at the cost of
flexibility, responsiveness, and agility. However, given Israel’s
small geographic size, the relative proximity of the threats it faces,
and the Air Force’s resultant operational reach, centralized control
makes contextual sense.21 For these and related reasons, the Israeli
18 See generally Itai Brun, Israeli Air Power, in GLOBAL AIR POWER 137, 137–172
(John Andreas Olsen ed., 2011) (outlining the history of the Israeli Air Force and
how it operated within the framework of the IDF).
19 The strike on Iraq’s nuclear facility at Osirak occurred on June 7, 1981. Israel
justified this strike before the UN Security Council on the basis of “its inherent right
of self-defense as understood in general international law and as preserved in
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.” U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., 2280th mtg.
at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2280 (June 12, 1981). Israel launched the strike on a Sunday in
order to limit collateral damage. Yehuda Z. Blum, Letter Dated June 8, 1981 from
the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/14510 (June 8, 1981).
20 David E. Sanger & Mark Mazzetti, Israel Struck Syrian Nuclear Project,
Analysts
Say,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
14,
2007),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/ 10/14/washington/14weapons.html?. The
International Atomic Energy Agency later confirmed the site was in fact a nuclear
reactor. Associated Press, IAEA Chief: Syria Tried to Build Nuclear Reactor, NBC NEWS
(Apr. 28, 2011), http://www. nbcnews.com/id/42798472/ns/world_newsmideast_n_africa/t/iaea-chief-syria-tried-build-nuclear-reactor/.
Note
that
discussion of the Syrian strike is based on open source material, not discussions
with IDF personnel.
21 “Operational reach” is defined in U.S. Joint Doctrine as “the distance and
duration across which a joint force can successfully employ its military
capabilities.” CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-0 JOINT
OPERATIONS III–28 (2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_03.pdf.
That is the sense in which it is used here.
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Air Force headquarters is best positioned to marshal airborne
platforms and to direct their strikes.
Conversely, the IDF’s Ground Forces, consisting of infantry,
armor, and supporting arms such as artillery and combat engineers,
are organized for the immediate defense of the Israeli homeland, as
well as for offensive operations of a relatively limited reach beyond
the borders of Israel. Consequently, it operates in a decentralized
fashion. Geographically, the Ground Forces are organized into three
major Regional Commands, as well as a Home Front Command
charged primarily with civil defense. While Israel’s relatively small
size and interior position allow for some repositioning of forces
when necessary to undertake major ground combat, broadly
speaking the Southern Command is responsible for the Gaza Strip,
the Northern Command is focused on Lebanon and the Golan
Heights, and Central Command confronts threats arising in the
West Bank.22 Each Regional Command in turn consists of one or
more Divisions, which are further subdivided into Brigades,
Battalions, and Companies.
Unlike the U.S. all-volunteer professional military, Israeli
citizens are conscripted into the IDF. With a few notable exceptions,
every Israeli male must serve a 32-month tour of duty upon reaching
the age of 18; females serve for 28-months.23 Following active
service, Israelis remain in the reserve forces and are subject to
mobilization.24 This shared experience creates strong ties between
the military and the general population and has long been viewed
as “an essential rite of passage.”25
Universal conscription affects Israeli values, which in turn
influence how Israel fights. Yagil Levy has proffered a compelling
argument that the practice of universal conscription shapes the
perceived value of individual Israeli soldiers, thereby creating a
22 See Structure of the Israel Defense Forces, WIKIPEDIA (Feb. 14, 2009),
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fe/Structure_idf.png
(depicting the IDF force structure).
23 Defence Service Law, 5746-1986, 40 LSI 112 Art. 1, 13 (amended 1989) (Isr.),
available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfa-archive/1980-1989/pages/defence
service law -consolidated version-- 5746-1.aspx (Art. 1 defines the military age as
18, and Art. 13 authorizes the IDF to call conscripts to service).
24 Id. at Art. 27.
25 Stuart A. Cohen, The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF): From a “People’s Army” to a
“Professional Military”–Causes and Implications, 21 ARMED FORCES AND SOC’Y 237, 244
(1995).
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high degree of casualty-aversion.26 Conscription also nurtures
republicanism, which “means that the state coercively mobilizes its
youth in return for political and social rights accrued by the social
networks that offer up their children to military service.”27 This
gives the broader Israeli public a greater voice in the conduct of
military affairs and adds weight to its demands that soldiers be
protected and that losses be justified.28
This attitudinal dynamic has direct operational consequences.
Levy suggests, for example, that casualty-aversion leads the Israelis
to liberally apply force, particularly airstrikes and counter-battery
fire, in order to “guarantee force protection.”29 He also asserts that
extreme sensitivity toward the well-being of its soldiers has led
Israel to negotiate prisoner exchanges with Hezbollah and Hamas in
which it pays a seemingly disproportionate price.30 For instance, in
the case of Corporal Gilad Shalit, captured by Hamas in 2006, Israel
agreed in 2011 to release over 1,000 Hamas prisoners, including
hundreds convicted of murder. They were released to the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, where many re-engaged in combat against
Israel.31 The contrast between this exchange and that undertaken by
the United States for the return of Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl is stark.
Bergdahl was exchanged for five Taliban prisoners who were
released into custody in Qatar and thus unlikely, at least in the shortterm, to return to combat against.32
26 DANIEL BYMAN, A HIGH PRICE 364 (2011); Yagil Levy, The Paradox of
Recruitment, 14:2 DEFENCE STUDIES 216, 226 (2014).
27 Levy, supra note 26, at 219.
28 Id. at 221.
29 Id. at 226.
30 See RUTH LEVUSH, LAW LIBRARY OF CONG., ISRAEL: LEGAL ASPECTS OF PRISONER
EXCHANGES 2 (2014) (observing that “[t]he rescue of those in captivity, known in
Hebrew as pidyon sheuyim, has traditionally been considered a basic obligation
under Jewish law and has been followed in Jewish communities for generations”).
31 Id.; Levy, supra note 26, at 227. See also Ronen Bergman, Gilad Shalit and the
Rising Price of an Israeli Life, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 9, 2011, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/magazine/gilad-shalit-and-the-cost-ofan-israeli-life.html?pagewanted=all (detailing the history of negotiations for Israeli
prisoners of war).
32 Chuck Hagel, U.S. SEC’Y OF DEF., Transfer of Five Senior Taliban Detainees,
Address Before the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of
Chuck Hagel, Secretary of Defense of the United States). See also Testimony of U.S.
Secretary of Defense Hagel, House Armed Services Committee, VOICE OF AMERICA (June
11, 2014), http://www.voanews.com/content/secretary-of-defense-chuck-hagelhearing-on-the-transfer-of-detainees-house-armed-services-committee/1934678.
html (explaining the decision to transfer detainees in order to free Sergeant
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Israeli sensitivity towards captured personnel also has direct
operational consequences. In 1986 the IDF implemented the
“Hannibal Directive,” which reportedly states that “‘[i]n case of
capture, the main mission becomes rescuing our soldiers from the
captors, even at the cost of hitting or wounding our soldiers.’”33 The
directive illustrates the extent to which the desire to deny its enemies
the opportunity to leverage Israeli concern for the safety of its
soldiers influences Israeli military decision-making.
The value Israel places on its soldiers is matched by acute
sensitivity to the daily dangers its civilian population faces. Over
six million of Israel’s eight million citizens live within range of
Hamas and Hezbollah indirect fire weapons. Over the last decade,
suicide bombings, small arms attacks, and kidnappings have also
featured prominently in operations targeting Israeli civilians.
Israel’s enemies, facing an overwhelmingly superior military force,
have logically, albeit tragically and unlawfully, identified the
civilian population as a center of gravity and regularly targeted it
directly.
The perceived threat to the civilian population understandably
lies at the heart of Israeli strategy and planning. To neutralize the
rocket threat, Israel has invested heavily in static defenses, including
the Iron Dome system that has been relatively effective at preventing
rockets from impacting in Israeli population centers.34 For instance,
during the hostilities in 2014 the system intercepted 584 rockets;
only 115 of the over 3,000 launched landed in populated areas.35 As
further defense against rocket attacks, Israel has constructed an
early warning system and an elaborate network of hardened
Bergdahl). The U.S. Government Accountability Office issued a report to Congress
that concluded this prisoner swap violated the law by failing to inform Congress as
required by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113–76, § 8111,
128 Stat. 5, 131 (Jan. 17, 2014). SUSAN A. POLING, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
B–326013, 4–5 (2014). It resulted in a non-binding resolution from the U.S. House
of Representative “condemn[ing] and disapprov[ing]” of the failure of the
President to comply with the law. H.R. Res. 644, 113th Cong. (2014).
33 Levush, supra note 30, at 3; Ruth Margalit, Hadar Goldin and the Hannibal
Directive, NEW YORKER MAG. (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/
news-desk/hadar-goldin-hannibal-directive.
34 Steven Erlanger, A Growing Arsenal of Homegrown Rockets Encounters Israel’s
Iron Dome, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 9, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
07/10/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-missiles-iron-dome.html?_r=0 (explaining
the expense of the Iron Dome system and the cost-benefit analysis of using it).
35 By the Numbers, supra note 12.
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shelters across the country.36 The IDF’s Home Front Command also
maintains evacuation plans to support the mass relocation of Israeli
civilians from threatened areas, as occurred in the 2006 Lebanon
War when many Israelis moved out of the northern area of the
country.37 Given the dramatically increased range of Hezbollah and
Hamas rockets since then, it is an open question whether evacuation
to “safe zones” remains a viable option for protecting the civilian
population.
The perception that the Israeli civilian population is at constant
risk likewise drives IDF targeting. Iron Dome does not intercept
every rocket38 and Hamas fighters repeatedly infiltrate the Israeli
border to conduct raids and kidnappings through tunnels that are
up to three kilometers long and forty kilometers deep. As a result,
during Operation Protective Edge, the 2014 Israeli campaign, the
IDF placed a high priority on the location and destruction of rockets,
launching sites, weapons caches, and tunnels used by Hamas to
infiltrate into Israel. Over the course of the operation, the IDF claims
to have destroyed hundreds of rockets and much of Hamas’ rocket
launching infrastructure and to have discovered thirty-two
tunnels.39
A key feature of the operating environment that bears on how
the IDF fights is that it does so on terrain that it knows very well.
Israel occupied the Gaza Strip until its unilateral disengagement in
200540 and has engaged in several operations in Gaza since then, two
36 Israel’s Civil Defense Law of 1951 requires all homes to include bomb
shelters and mandates the construction of public shelters as well. Civil Defense
Law, 5711-1951, 5 LSI 72 (5711-1950/51) (Isr.). The Israeli Home Front Command’s
public information website also details the requirements for shelter construction.
Bomb Shelters, HOME FRONT COMMAND, http://www.oref.org.il/11154en/Pakar.aspx.
37 Amos Harel, IDF Preparing for Mass Evacuations in Case of Hezbollah Missile
Strike, HAARETZ (May 20, 2010), http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/
idf-preparing-for-mass-evacuations-in-case-of-hezbollah-missile-strike-1.291119#!.
38 Erlanger, supra note 34.
39 By the Numbers, supra note 12.
40 The unilateral disengagement was proposed by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
and adopted by the Israeli Cabinet on June 6, 2004. See ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFF. THE CABINET RESOLUTION REGARDING THE DISENGAGEMENT PLAN (2004), available
at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/mfadocumentspages/
revised%20disengagement%20plan%206-june-2004.aspx (detailing the Israeli plan
for withdrawing from Gaza). See also Greg Myre, Israeli Withdrawal From Gaza
Proceeds
Faster
Than
Predicted,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Aug.
19,
2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/19/international/middleeast/20gazacnd.ht
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of which included large ground incursions.41 Southern Lebanon
was occupied by the Israelis from 1985 to 2000,42 and Israel fought
the 2006 Second Lebanon War in the terrain south of the Litani
River.43 Israel continues to occupy the West Bank and Golan
Heights. In short, Israel benefits from an exceedingly high degree
of situational awareness of its likely battlefields.
Israel also boasts one of the world’s most technologically
advanced military arsenals. It employs advanced fighter aircraft
and unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with state-of-the-art
sensors and the latest precision-guided munitions.44 Additionally,
Israel has access to an impressive human intelligence network. One
virtue of Israel’s unique history as the Jewish homeland has been its
ability to draw on a diverse and multi-cultural pool of human
capital; its Arab, Druse, and other ethnic and linguistic communities
facilitate a deep understanding of its adversaries and enhance its
ability to collect actionable intelligence.45 As a result of these
technical and intelligence advantages, Israel enjoys an impressive
military edge in conventional terms over its opponents.
2.2. Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Pursuit of Asymmetries
Just as Israel seeks to comprehend its adversaries and adapt its
operations to them, so too do its key opponents, especially Hamas
and Hezbollah. Both organizations recognize Israeli conventional
military superiority, but equally grasp what Israel values—its
soldiers’ well being and the security of its civilian population. The

ml?ex= 1125115200&en=d8aefb293ac0e831&ei=5070&emc=eta1 (describing the
withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza in 2005).
41 Operation Cast Lead and Operation Protective Edge both involved ground
force incursions into the Gaza Strip.
42 See Marjorie Miller et al., Israel Leaves South Lebanon After 22 Years, L.A. TIMES
(May 24, 2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/may/24/news/mn-33497
(describing Israel’s military campaign in Lebanon and its eventual withdrawal).
43 STEPHAN D. BIDDLE & JEFFREY A. FRIEDMAN, The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and
the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy, STRATEGIC STUDIES
INST., 32 (Sept. 2008).
44 Brun, supra note 18, at 171; ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, ARAB-ISRAELI MILITARY
FORCES IN AN ERA OF ASYMMETRIC WARS 118–119 (2006).
45 CORDESMAN, supra note 44, at 132–33.
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result is strategies of asymmetry that seek leverage over Israel by
putting those values at risk.46
Hezbollah’s tactics and strategy during 2006, for example, were
characterized by a “hybrid warfare” approach that blended guerrilla
tactics with conventional ones.47 The approach was designed to
neutralize Israeli air power long enough to strike at Israel’s
perceived weakness—the civilian population.
Rather than
launching small-scale harassing attacks and then melting away into
a civilian population, Hezbollah chose to employ short-range
rockets against Israeli population centers in the north of Israel, and
then protected these easily-concealed weapons using a layered
ground defense designed to deny the IDF access to the launch sites.48
The goal was to inflict pain on Israeli society, while fostering
regional and global concern over Israel’s retaliatory strikes. Both
strands of the strategy were intended to create pressure on Israel to
yield.49
In this strategy, Hezbollah eschewed the use of its more
powerful and longer-range rockets, because these would be
vulnerable to Israeli airpower, as they are more easily located and
fewer in number.50 The Israeli air campaign that would have been
required to destroy the limited number of launchers would
presumably have been short, thereby depriving Hezbollah of the
time needed to marshal external political pressure on Israel.51
Instead, Hezbollah achieved asymmetry by forcing Israel into a
conventional ground campaign for which it found itself ill prepared.
Its infantry and armored forces, focused as it was on low-intensity
conflict, had slowly lost the art of combined arms fire and
maneuvering.52 Instead, the IDF had grown reliant on precision air
46 See, e.g., Rockets from Gaza: Harm to Civilians from Palestinian Armed Groups’
Rocket Attacks, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/node/
84868 (detailing Palestinian rocket attacks on Israel and a number of civilian deaths
that have resulted from them).
47 The term “hybrid warfare” refers to the employment of conventional,
irregular, and even terrorist tactics in combination, often simultaneously. Frank G.
Hoffman, Hybrid Warfare and Challenges, 52 JOINT FORCES Q. 34, 35 (Jan. 2009).
Hezbollah has been singled-out as particularly adept at hybrid warfare. Id. at 37.
48 Biddle & Friedman, supra note 43, at 49–50.
49 Id. at 50.
50 Id. at 49.
51 Id. at 50 n,101.
52 Johnson, supra note 9, at 2–3.
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strikes and the luxury of choosing when to fight, in order to avoid
casualties.
Hezbollah’s strategy was simple and elegant: mitigate the
effects of Israeli airpower, put up a stubborn ground defense to
inflict heavy IDF casualties, and shower northern Israel with rockets
that terrorize Israeli civilians.53 As a result, Israel paid a high price
in Lebanon during the intense ground fighting.54 Many judge the
conflict to have been a qualified Israeli defeat.
Hamas’ tactics and strategy in the recent Gaza conflict were
dramatically different, but also calculated to create asymmetry. The
Gaza Strip is an almost entirely urban battlefield. Only 40
kilometers long and 10 deep, Gaza is densely packed with civilians
and civilian objects.55 Hamas exploits this reality intentionally.
During every round of hostilities in Gaza since Israel’s unilateral
disengagement, Hamas has fought almost exclusively from among
the civilian population. It employs both voluntary and involuntary
(those taken to the target area or forced to remain there) human
shields, conducts command and control from civilian homes, caches
weapons in civilian property, often fails to wear uniforms or
otherwise distinguish its fighters from civilians, prohibits or deters
civilians from leaving areas likely to be targeted, and fires rockets
from schools, mosques, United Nations facilities, and civilian
residences.56 It seeks to create asymmetry by using the law, which it
53 See generally ANDREW EXUM, HIZBALLAH AT WAR: A MILITARY ASSESSMENT 8
(2006) (Wash. Inst. for Near E. Policy, Policy Focus No. 63, Dec. 2006) (describing
Hezbollah’s thought process and preparation prior to the conflict and the
complexity of its tactics). See also BYMAN, supra note 26, at 256 (noting that as many
as 500,000 Israelis were forced to leave their homes and another one million
regularly hid in shelters).
54 Exum, supra note 53, at 3.
55 LEVY, supra note 26, at 193.
56 Israel has put forth numerous claims of violations of the “LOAC” by Hamas,
including deliberate rocket attacks against Israeli population centers, using civilian
persons and objects to shield military operations, and misuse of protected property.
See, e.g., UNRWA Strongly Condemns Placement of Rockets in School, UNRWA (July
press-releases/unrwa17, 2014), http://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/
strongly-condemns-placement-rockets-school (reporting on the UNRWA’s
condemnation of Hamas); UNRWA Condemns Placement of Rockets, For A Second
Time,
in
One
of
its
Schools
UNRWA
(July
22,
2014),
http://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/press-releases/unrwa-condemns-placementrockets-second-time-one-its-schools
(reporting
the
UNRWA’s
further
condemnation of Hamas); STATE OF ISRAEL, THE OPERATION IN GAZA: FACTUAL AND
LEGAL ASPECTS (2009), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jps.2010.
XXXIX.1.186 (reporting on Hamas’ breaches of the law of armed conflict and war
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often disregards, to counterbalance Israeli conventional
superiority.57
Like Hezbollah, Hamas appreciates the enormous value Israel
places on its civilian population and soldiers. To leverage these
concerns to its benefit, for example, it fires rockets indiscriminately
at Israeli civilian population centers to terrorize civilians and
provoke an Israel military response, which the international
Hamas also
community may perceive as heavy-handed.58
increasingly relies on an elaborate tunnel network. Designed to
offset the IDF’s reliance on air power and its employment of UAVs
for observation, the group has increasingly gone underground.59
Some tunnels are used to infiltrate into Israel to conduct attacks or
to overwhelm isolated IDF positions and, in particular, take
prisoners. Others are filled with explosives and detonated under
IDF positions or used as “bait”, that is, designed to be discovered by
the IDF and then detonated while its forces are inside. Still others
are used to move personnel and material within, to, and from Gaza.
The description of the Israeli operating environment is
necessarily a simplification; it does not fully capture the myriad
nuances of this complex and evolving conflict. The purpose was
instead to identify those aspects of the operating environment that,
from the Israeli perspective, may influence how IDF approaches
targeting in light of LOAC requirements. The perception that the
crimes); By the Numbers, supra note 12 (publishing the numbers associated with the
IDF’s action against Hamas’ attacks). The Human Rights Watch, other NGO’s, and
the United Nations have confirmed some of these allegations. See, e.g., Q&A: 2014
Hostilities between Israel and Hamas, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 3, 2014), available at
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/03/qa-2014-hostilities-between-israel-andhamas [hereinafter HRW Q&A].
57 See JINSA-COMMISSIONED GAZA CONFLICT TASK FORCE, 2014 GAZA WAR
ASSESSMENT: THE NEW FACE OF CONFLICT (Mar. 2015), http://www.jinsa.org/files/
2014GazaAssessmentReport.pdf [hereinafter Gaza War Assessment] (explaining
how Hamas exploited the IDF’s respect for the rules of armed conflict by
embedding military capabilities in densely populated civilian areas).
58 See id., at 19–20 (stating that “Hamas provoked and exacerbated the
destruction caused by IDF responses that incidentally resulted in collateral damage.
At best, Hamas acted with reckless disregard for the sagety of both Israeli and
Gazan civilians; at worst, it deliberately sought to put civilians in harm’s way.”).
59 The Israeli government has provided detailed claims about Hamas’ tunnel
network and its uses on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. See generally Map
of Rocket Launches from Gaza, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2013)
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/FAQ/Pages/Operation-Protective-EdgeThe-facts.aspx#blank.
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Israeli civilian population is at constant risk, the high value placed
on the security of individual IDF soldiers and the adaptive, and
asymmetric nature of the threat posed by Hamas and Hezbollah,
taken in combination, help explain Israel’s operational dilemmas
and, at least in part, its positions on the LOAC applicable to
targeting.
3. IDF TARGETING PROCESSES
Since Israeli ground and air forces fulfill dissimilar roles and are
accordingly organized differently, they both employ distinct
approaches to the targeting process. The way in which the IDF
engages in targeting in turn drives the manner in which legal advice
is provided to critical decision-makers.
Before turning to the topic of targeting processes, a cautionary
note is required. The procedures set forth apply to typical military
strikes. However, in certain circumstances an attack (or a series of
attacks) may be especially sensitive, for instance because there is
likely to be high collateral damage, the target is politicized, the strike
will occur on another State’s territory, or it takes place during a
period in which high-intensity hostilities are not underway. In these
situations, the political leadership may be involved in the approval
process. If so, the Attorney General or a member of her staff, the
Military Advocate General or a member of the International Law
Department, operations officers, and anyone else needed to explain
the proposed strike may be called on to assist political leaders in
assessing it prior to approval.
3.1. Ground Forces
Given their geographic focus, Israeli ground forces must excel at
understanding and developing their local environment in order to
engage primarily dynamic or emerging targets, called Time Critical
Targets (“TCTs”) in IDF parlance. These are targets that suddenly
present themselves and have to be struck in real-time, as opposed to
pre-planned targets identified in advance of the operation. Because
Israel’s enemies often fight from urban areas and civilian structures,
many IDF targets are TCTs. Indeed, former MAG officers recounted
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circumstances in which most of the preplanned targets were quickly
exhausted in the early days of a conflict and operations came to be
almost entirely dedicated to striking dynamic and emerging targets.
The Authors visited the Southern Command’s Gaza Division
headquarters to observe the IDF’s methodology for engaging TCTs.
The approach is centered on “Attack Cells” at the Division level and
Regional Commands.60 These cells provide the Division the capacity
to conduct simultaneous real-time targeting in a decentralized
manner that allows it to maintain speed and flexibility. The concept
of a special targeting cell operating out of a tactical headquarters is
not novel. In the U.S. system, each joint force commander fields
some type of targeting cell in which real-time intelligence is fused
and presented to a staff cell that brings together artillery, aviation,
and air force officers to locate, verify, and strike multiple targets.61
At the Brigade level and below, these generally take the form of
large staff cells that process all targets to be engaged by that echelon
of command.62 The IDF has simply taken this concept and adapted
it to the specific military problem it faces in the Gaza Strip. Rather
than having one large targeting cell, IDF Divisions use multiple
smaller Attack Cells that are task-organized to confront specific
threats or take on discrete missions with a wide degree of autonomy.
The IDF would not reveal the exact number of cells that any
particular Division employs, but suggested that a Division has the
capability to stand up as many as needed for the particular conflict.
Every cell is assigned specific missions, based on such factors as
weapons platforms, operational and maneuver boundaries, or
specific threats. Some cells may control weapons platforms of all
types, but only for a specified area of operations, while others are
charged with locating and targeting a specific enemy threat, such as
rocket launchers and rocket firing positions or command and
control nodes. For air assets, the cell coordinates with its targeting
60 In the “IDF” Ground Force Division the Authors visited, these cells are
colloquially known as Fire Canopies.
61 The organizing principles for U.S. joint targeting cells are broadly described
in CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3–60, JOINT TARGETING III-1
(2013), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/06/Joint_Chiefs-Joint_Targeting_20130131.pdf [hereinafter JP 3-60].
62 See, e.g., ARMY TECHNIQUES PUBLICATION 3-60, TARGETING at 4–2 to -6 (2010),
available at http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/atp3_60.pdf
(detailing the Brigade Combat Team’s (“BCT”) board membership, responsibilities,
and guidance provided by the BCT commander.)

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss1/3

2015]

TYRANNY OF CONTEXT

73

counterparts at the Air Force Headquarters through an air liaison
officer. The mission and the operational plan will dictate how the
Division organizes its cells, and how many it activates. This
approach affords the IDF a flexible and potent capability.
Attack Cells may be as large or as streamlined as the mission
requires, but all of them will have a certain minimum composition.
Each is under the responsible command of one officer (the Attack
Cell Commander), typically a Field-Grade Officer. The Commander
makes the ultimate decision on a strike, so long as the rules of
engagement permit the decision to be made at this level. In some
circumstances and with respect to certain targets, the rules of
engagement will specify higher level authorization.
The Commander of the cell is supported by a Targeting Officer
capable of coordinating the specific weapons platforms needed for
the strike, as well as by intelligence officers to manage the various
sources of intelligence being fed to that cell. Depending on the
mission and organization of a particular cell, this may include visual
intelligence (VISINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT) or human
intelligence (HUMINT). Operators with expertise in the weapons
platforms at the disposal of the cell are also present. For instance, if
the cell employs attack aviation, a pilot may be a part of the cell,
while those employing counter-battery artillery will have counterfire radar experts and artillery officers assigned. An Operations
Sergeant tracks the cell’s activities. Attack cells regularly receive
training in the LOAC.
The most prominent characteristic of the Attack Cells is the
decentralized nature of the targeting decisions. Multiple cells have
the authority to coordinate and direct strikes using the available
weapons platforms. Because the number, composition, and mission
of these cells varies based on the operation, and because cells
operate autonomously, it is essential that Cell Commanders be wellversed in the Rules of Engagement, LOAC, and any specified
precautionary measures that are required before strikes are
executed.
IDF lawyers directly advise the Division Commander, but not
the Attack Cell commanders, a significant point in light of the
decentralized nature of the targeting. To ensure compliance with
LOAC rules, lawyers are heavily involved in developing targeting
rules and assisting the Division Commander in overseeing Attack
Cell operations. Strikes that fall outside the parameters provided to
the cell have to be elevated up the chain of command to the
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appropriate decision-maker, who makes the final targeting decision
with the assistance of his legal advisor. As a general matter,
however, IDF lawyers are not involved in individual ground force
targeting decisions; in contrast, a U.S. targeting cell will always
contain an embedded legal advisor.
3.2. Air Forces
Because of its strategic mission and operational reach, as well as
Israel’s interior position and the proximity of threats, the IDF Air
Force operates in a much more centralized manner. Furthermore, in
conjunction with the Regional Commands, it is responsible for
developing and striking pre-planned targets.63
The Air Force’s targeting process can roughly be broken down
into several discrete steps: Target Development, Target Assessment,
Pre-Strike Controls, and Strike Operations. It must be cautioned
that the IDF was reluctant to reveal the specific command and
control or doctrinal decision-making processes it utilizes for air
strikes. Therefore, these “steps” represent the Authors’ attempt to
categorize the various activities performed during the deliberate
targeting process, as explained by the IDF.64
3.2.1. Target Development
Target development is concerned with identifying what to attack.
The central feature of the process is the “Target Bank,” a master list
of pre-planned targets developed by IDF commanders to achieve
desired operational effects it anticipates needing. Like any other
advanced military, the IDF is constantly engaged in developing war
plans for a variety of future contingencies, even during peacetime.
63 See generally Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict
Research, Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare
(Yoram Dinstein gen. ed. 2013) [hereinafter AMW Manual] (restating the law of air
warfare).
64 In actual fact, the “IDF” process employs a total of ten discrete steps, but all
of them are captured under the four broad categories we describe here. See Gaza
War Assessment, supra note 57, at 22(detailing the process by which IDF adheres to
LOAC).
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When hostilities break out, additional pre-planned targets are
developed in an expedited fashion and added to the Target Bank.
The target development process begins with a review of a target
in light of the mission objectives. In this phase, planners identify the
desired effect they need to achieve. For instance, must the target be
destroyed or merely degraded to achieve the desired effect? Or,
must a line of communication such as a road or airfield be rendered
permanently unusable or only taken out of use for a specific period
of time?
This process also determines the “uncertainty”
surrounding the target. How specific is the intelligence in terms of
geographic and temporal certainty? What intelligence gaps remain
and how may the intelligence taskings be refined to resolve doubt?
During target development, strike planners consider the specific
target geometry and what would be required to achieve the desired
operational effect. Planners may also outline in general terms
whether a target should be struck by day or night. Finally, the time
sensitivity of the target is examined. When during the campaign
must the target be attacked to achieve the desired operational effect?
Can the target be re-attacked later if the initial attack fails to achieve
the desired effect?
IDF lawyers figure heavily in this process. Once planners
identify and propose targets based on anticipated or actual missions
and operational goals, lawyers from the International Law
Department (ILD, discussed below) review each. When hostilities
break out, the ILD is augmented by a group of additional LOAC
experts, including both active duty and reserve officers; this
combined entity is known as the Operational Law Apparatus (OLA)
and is commanded by the head of the Department. With sensitivity
to policy and operational considerations, members of the OLA first
determine whether the proposed target qualifies as a “military
objective,” a term defined below. It is during this review, and
especially for fixed targets such as command and control nodes,
critical lines of communication, arms caches, or fixed military
facilities, that possible proportionality concerns (also discussed
below) are highlighted.
MAG officers utilize a detailed checklist to perform the legal
review of the proposed strike (Appendix I). Based on this initial
assessment, each target is designated as “Approved,”
“Conditional,” or “Not Approved.” “Approved” means that it is a
military objective and may be struck, subject to the rule of
proportionality and the taking of required precautions in attack,
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legal requirements that will be developed in Part IV.
A
“Conditional” target is a military objective, which may be lawfully
attacked provided certain precedential conditions are met.65 For
example, if the target is a road or bridge used by the civilian
population, the condition may be that it only be struck at night when
civilians are not present and the rule of proportionality is unlikely
to be violated. Similarly, the condition may be that civilians be
evacuated from the target area prior to attack to ensure the strike
complies with the proportionality rule. Targets that are “Not
Approved” are those that the initial review determines do not meet
the military objective criteria. For instance, the OLA may decide that
insufficient information exists to conclude a civilian residence is
presently being used for military purposes and that, therefore, it
does not qualify as a military objective. Or the OLA may conclude
that the rule of proportionality will certainly be violated because the
expected collateral damage is excessive to the military advantage
anticipated to accrue from the attack, irrespective of how and when
it is struck. Such targets may not be attacked over the objection of
the legal officers.
3.2.2. Target Assessment
Whereas target development is concerned with determining
what to attack, target assessment focuses on how and when to attack.
The target assessment phase begins when a target enters the Target
Bank and continues through the post-strike phase as Battle Damage
Assessments (BDA) and debriefings are conducted. Many of the
activities described in this phase may have already occurred once,
in at least a rudimentary way, during Target Development. In
Target Assessment, these steps are re-addressed in a refined way.
Therefore, Target Assessment is less a “step” or “phase” in the
targeting process than a component in a continuous loop of
intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination.
During Target Assessment, planners again identify any specially
protected persons or objects under the LOAC, like medical facilities,
that are in the target area and assess the likelihood of collateral
damage to civilian persons or objects that may result. They also
65 Gaza War Assessment, supra note 57, at 22, (referring to the “conditional”
approval of a target as “qualified;” the meaning is the same).
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designate “dead-space” near the target that is relatively free of
civilians and important civilian property, such as an abandoned
building or an open area in a depression. The dead spaces are noted
for possible use during execution of the strike as a location towards
which a steerable weapon such as a laser-guided missile may be
diverted to limit unanticipated collateral damage. IDF lawyers in
the OLA provide around-the-clock advice to planners and
commanders as they refine target intelligence to ensure compliance
with the LOAC.
This situational understanding informs the weaponeering
process, which in the IDF is elaborate and sophisticated. Broadly
speaking, “weaponeering” is the selection of the means (weapon)
and method (tactic) that will be employed to attack a particular
target. Effective weaponeering is as much a military art as it is a
military science.66
During weaponeering, expert planners adjust the munition, the
delivery platform, the angle of attack, and other physical variables
in order to best achieve the desired military effect while complying
with the LOAC requirement to minimize or eliminate collateral
damage to protected persons and property. For instance, the IDF
often employs specially configured smaller warheads with reduced
explosive material against targets in urban areas to limit collateral
damage. Other warheads have been re-engineered to generate
lighter fragments upon detonation so that the fragments travel
shorter distances from the point of impact. Additionally, pilots and
operational planners with training in physics and aerodynamics
determine the appropriate angle of attack – the vector upon which
munitions will be released from attack platforms—in order to direct
the blast away from nearby civilian persons or objects while
achieving the desired effect. Of particular note is the fact that,
whenever feasible, the IDF uses engineers alongside munitions
experts and pilots to better understand the impact of an attack on
structures. Operating as a team, the various participants can assess
such issues as the penetrating characteristics and explosive effects of
the weapons in the context of particular targets, the accuracy needed
to achieve the desired destructive effect, the fusing that will ensure

66 See JP 3–60, supra note 61, at GL–11(defining weaponeering as “the process
of determining the quantity of a specific type of lethal or nonlethal means required
to create a desired effect on a given target.”).
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warheads detonate in such a way as to contain and direct the blast,
and the effects of weather and other variables.
Finally, the IDF has adapted to fight under the particular
circumstances it faces – combat in urban terrain against an
adversary that routinely fails to distinguish itself from the civilian
population and uses that population and civilian objects to shield its
forces and operations from attack.
Since the IDF is not
expeditionary, the IDF has been able to develop a deep
understanding of the most likely theaters of operations—Gaza,
Lebanon and the West Bank. For instance, its planners have a
granular appreciation of such critical targeting matters as the usual
pattern of civilian life in the target area, construction materials used
to build homes and other structures, and the load-bearing capacity
of roads and bridges. It is therefore especially well equipped to
precisely identify the required destructive capacity of the weapons
it employs against particular targets and the likely collateral damage
that will result from an attack.

3.2.3. Pre-Strike Controls
Targets that have been developed and assessed remain in the
Target Bank until the decision is made to strike a target. At that
point, additional pre-strike controls are implemented. The target is
re-verified – appropriate intelligence assets and other observation
platforms confirm the location of the target and that it remains a
valid military objective susceptible to attack. Pre-strike controls
include reassessment of the initial proportionality review conducted
during target development, since changes in the military situation
may decrease the military advantage anticipated or the previously
unidentified presence of protected persons or objects in the target
area might increase expected collateral damage. Proportionality is
monitored, to the extent feasible, until the moment of weapons
release. If significant new intelligence surfaces, a reassessment all
relevant officers involved in the targeting process, including the
legal advisor, is required.
Whenever feasible, the IDF employs various precautions aimed
at avoiding, or at least minimizing, the collateral damage expected
from the attack. These precautions may include, for example, visual
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observation by an RPA. This enables movable targets to be tracked
and facilitates the identification of civilians and civilian objects that
may have come into the target area unexpectedly in order to cancel,
divert, or modify a strike if necessary based on legal or rules of
engagement concerns.
Operators also attempt to maintain
observation of previously identified “dead-space” to maintain
whether its use remains viable if needed.
When civilians may be affected by an attack and it is militarily
feasible to do so, the IDF undertakes extensive measures to warn
them.67 Some, such as leaflet drops and general announcements to
the civilian population, are common in conflicts. It typically
announces that a particular area will be subject to attack and instruct
the population where to go to avoid its effects. In many cases, the
IDF contacts neighborhood leaders and ask them to encourage
civilians to leave the area. The IDF also delivers very precise
warnings of particular strikes. As described below, these include
direct phone communications with civilians in the target area and
so-called “knocks on the roof.” Human rights organizations
criticized both of the latter techniques during the recent Israeli
operation in Gaza, although the Authors did not find the criticism
well-grounded.68
To conduct the phone warnings, the IDF employs a specialized
team of trained personnel who run a “phone bank” with the sole
purpose of contacting individuals who might be affected by a strike.
The calls are in some cases extremely precise. For instance, the
warning may be that a strike will occur at a specified time. Live
operators make some phone warnings, while others consist of
67 See, e.g., How is the IDF Minimizing Harm to Civilians in Gaza?, OFFICIAL BLOG
ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (July 16, 2014), http://www.idfblog.com/blog/
2014/07/16/idf-done-minimize-harm-civilians-gaza/ (explaining the ways that
Israel warns civilians of imminent bomb attack, including: by phone, leaflets, and
roof-knocking).
68 See, e.g., Israel/Palestine: Unlawful Israeli Airstrikes Kill Civilians, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (July 16, 2014) http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/15/israelpalestineunlawful-israeli-airstrikes-kill-civilians (alleging that IDF warnings were not
effective because, in many cases, civilians were not given sufficient time to respond
to them before the attack occurred). With respect to the “knock on the roof,”
Amnesty International objects, stating that “there is no way that firing a missile at
a civilian home can constitute an effective warning.” Israel/Gaza: U.N. Must Impose
Arms Embargo and Mandate an International Investigation as Civilian Death Toll Rises,
AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL,
(July
11,
2014),
http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/news-item/
israelgaza-un-must-imposearms-embargo-and-mandate-an-international-investigation-as-civilian-death.
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generic pre-recorded messages. The personnel in the warning cell
speak Arabic fluently, have received cultural training on the civilian
population in the target area, and whenever feasible, use all-source
fused intelligence to focus on specific individuals who might be at
risk. For example, understanding Palestinian culture and family
structures, the warning cell may try to contact the male head of a
family in a particular apartment building, knowing that he will
effectively disseminate the warning to other family members. If a
minor or a female answers the phone call, the warning cell attempts
to speak to the head of the family. When several buildings in a
particular area are targeted, the warning cell may also contact a local
civilian official or an informal community leader who will be able to
spread the warning effectively and insist on obedience.
The IDF developed the controversial “knock on the roof”
technique for use when other warnings go unheeded or are
infeasible.69 The technique involves employing small sub-munitions
that impact one corner of the roof and detonates a very small
explosion that produces noise and concussion several minutes in
advance of the strike. The civilians are hopefully frightened into
dispersing. Once it has cleared the target area, the IDF launches the
attack.70
3.2.4. Strike Operations

69 This technique was heavily criticized in the “Goldstone Report.” See Human
Rights Council, Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, Human Rights in Palestine
and other Occupied Arab Territories, ¶¶ 532–535, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 15,
2009) at, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/
12session/A-HRC-12-48.pdf [hereinafter Goldstone Report] (criticizing the roofknocking warning as ineffective because citizens should not have to guess what the
warning means and may be potentially terrorized by the warning).
70 See LEVY, supra note 26, at 196–97 (describing the knock on the roof
technique). Video footage of the knock on the roof being delivered has been made
publicly available. The Authors also viewed a number of these videos. In one,
highlighted by the IDF as an optimal example, the IDF delivered a sub-munition in
a location on the roof where it did no harm to civilians. An RPA was employed to
observe each of the civilians clearing the target. Once the civilians were accounted
for away, the building was destroyed. Adam Taylor, Video: This is what an Israeli
‘roff knock’ looks like, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 14, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/07/14/videothis-is-what-an-israeli-roof-knock-looks-like/.
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Target development, target assessment, and pre-strike controls
continue until the moment of attack. The final decision to strike is
generally made at a high level in the Air Force Headquarters, where
a robust operations center monitors each target through strike
execution. Pilots retain the discretion to abort a mission if their own
observation of the target indicates that the unanticipated presence
of civilians or civilian objects in the target area requires the attack to
be cancelled on the basis of a change in proportionality. The IDF
stresses this responsibility, and the responsibility to take feasible
precautions in attack, to pilots in their training.
During interviews, IDF personnel cautioned that the operations
center often enjoys a better situational awareness of the target area
than the pilot. Whereas the pilot is limited to onboard sensors and
external feeds available in the aircraft, the operations center
generally enjoys a refined and stable visual picture of the target area
from RPA coverage and benefits from all-source intelligence fusion
capability. Thus, unless a pilot personally observes indicators that
raise doubt about the target, he or she is entitled to rely on the
discretion of the operations center in executing the strike.
The ultimate measure of control for air operations lies in the
senior decision-makers in the air operations center. While the IDF
did not consent to public identification of the individuals who
exercise this authority, it can be described as a cadre of very senior
decision-makers with extensive experience, training, and robust
support from intelligence analysts, weaponeering experts and legal
advisors. During the Authors’ interviews of senior IDF leaders, it
became clear that they are acutely aware of the scrutiny their attacks
receive and of their legal obligations. Indeed, in many cases they
disapprove of what are clearly lawful strikes on the basis that the
advantage likely to be gained is outweighed by potential negative
repercussions in the public information and strategic
communications arena (the so-called “CNN effect”), or based on
broader policy concerns that factor heavily in their decisions.
Immediately following an attack, the pilot, as well as ground
observers and other intelligence sources, conduct an assessment of
the strike’s effects, both in terms of Battle Damage Assessment and
collateral damage. This assessment feeds a “lessons learned”
process in which tactics, munitions, and the effectiveness of various
intelligence sources are analyzed and, when necessary, adjusted to
facilitate greater precision and better effects, as well as decreased
collateral damage, in subsequent attacks.
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4. THE MILITARY ADVOCATE GENERAL CORPS
Members of the Military Advocate General Corps, headed by the
Military Advocate General (MAG), are integral to the targeting
process.71 The MAG consists of approximately 1000 lawyers,
roughly 300 of whom are active duty. From this pool of military
lawyers, several dozen are selected to form the Operational Law
Apparatus, which, as described below, provides level advice during
the targeting process. Therefore, the composition and functions of
the MAG Corps are highly relevant to the IDF’s application of, and
compliance with, LOAC norms, both generally and with respect to
individual strikes.72
Broadly speaking, the MAG Corps consists of three
“professional systems.” “Law Enforcement” performs military
justice functions, and, of particular note with regard to targeting,
includes a team specially dedicated to Operational Matters that,
inter alia, handles incidents during combat. It advises the MAG on
whether to go forward with investigations into possible LOAC
violations and how their results should be handled. Should the
MAG decide to indict the individual(s) involved, MAG officers
assigned to the Law Enforcement system would conduct the
prosecution and provide defense services. However, the military
courts are not under the control of the MAG.

71 The purpose, structure, and functions of the Corps are set forth in Military
Justice Law and in Supreme Command Order no. 2.0613, THE MILITARY ADVOCATE–
GENERAL’S CORPS (Mar. 15, 1976) [hereinafter SCO 2.0613]. See also Supreme
Command Order no. 2.0201, THE PROFESSIONAL STAFF IN THE GENERAL STAFF (Aug. 1,
1966); MAG’S HEADQUARTERS’ INTERNAL REGULATIONS; and THE ORGANIZATIONAL
ORDER OF THE MAG HEADQUARTERS (July 2008) (constituting other relevant
directives). An extensive discussion of the Corps is contained in The Public
Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010, 2D REPORT, ISRAEL’S
MECHANISMS FOR EXAMINING AND INVESTIGATING COMPLAINTS AND CLAIMS OF
VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT ACCORDING TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Feb. 2013) [hereinafter Turkel Commission Report].
72 With respect to the material that follows, the Authors conducted extensive
interviews with MAG personnel, including the Military Advocate General, were
briefed by MAG personnel, and were permitted to review various documents by
the IDF. See also Turkel Commission Report, supra note 71, at 279–290 (discussing
“the mechanisms in Israel that examine and investigate complaints and claims of
violations of international humanitarian law”).
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The “Legal Advice” component consists of the Departments for
Advice and Legislation, Judea and Samaria (West Bank), and
International Law. Of these, the International Law Department
(ILD) has primary responsibility for legal policy issues regarding
international law, such as the use of particular weapons and tactics
and the legality of particular categories of targets, as well as the
interpretation and application of the LOAC during hostilities. MAG
officers assigned to ILD are involved in preparing relevant
operational plans, including the legal annexes thereto, and
operation-specific rules of engagement (ROE). Lawyers reporting to
the Chief of ILD serve with field units at the Division level and
provide legal advice to the Air Force during the targeting process.
As previously discussed, ILD is augmented during hostilities with
additional active duty and reserve LOAC experts to create the
“Operational Law Apparatus” (reservists remain subordinate to the
active duty MAG officers, irrespective of rank, when rendering legal
advice on operational matters).
The OLA was established
doctrinally in 2007 following the Second Lebanon War and first
employed during Operation Cast Lead in 2009. Prior to that time,
MAG officers were present only in certain units. Today, at least
three legal advisers will be assigned to every Division engaged in
combat. All those who serve in a supplementary role receive
operational law training conducted jointly by ILD and the MAG
School.
It is noteworthy that military justice and operational law
functions are stove-piped; it is only at the level of the MAG that
lawyers performing the two functions report to the same officer.
This ensures that those providing advice to the MAG on how to
handle a questionable incident are not in the chain of command of
anyone involved in the situation.
The third professional system is “Training and Research.” In
addition to their formal academic education as lawyers, which
sometimes includes postgraduate education at top tier law schools,
MAG officers benefit from training at the Military Law School. The
School plays a central role in the ability of the MAG Corps to
provide quality legal advice during targeting operations. The
School’s basic curriculum provides MAG officers a heavy dose of
LOAC, while specialized LOAC courses include a combination of
classroom work and practical exercises. The Authors had the
opportunity to meet with most members of the International Law
Department regarding substantive legal issues and were struck by
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their grasp of the nuances of LOAC, in particular its practical
application.73

Treaty74 and customary law75 mandate LOAC training for all
members of the armed forces, a requirement that is mirrored in IDF
73 The organizational chart is based on materials provided to the Authors by
the IDF.
74 See, e.g., Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field art. 47, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 48, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War art. 127, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention (IV)
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 144, Aug. 12, 1949,
75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC I, GC II, GC III, and GC IV, respectively]; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 83, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international
Armed Conflicts, art. 19 June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II];
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,
art. 25 May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240; Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of
1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, art. 30,
Mar. 26, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S. 212; and Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on
the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, art. 6, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137
[hereinafter CCW].
75 See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (“ICRC”), CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 142 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds.,
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regulations.76 The MAG School provides non-MAG officers
instruction in general LOAC principles, targeting, measures of
special protection, enemy property, enemy civilian property,
humanitarian obligations towards the civilian population,
command responsibility, prisoners of war, weapons, and
occupation law. As the chart below indicates, such training is
tailored to rank, responsibility, and function.77

2005) [hereinafter CIHL Study] (outlining the commentary to Rule 6, which states
“Civilians are protected against, attack, unless and for such time as they take a
direct part in hostilities”).
76 IDF General Staff Order 33.0133, Discipline–Acting in Accordance with
International Conventions to which the State of Israel is Party (July 20, 1982), ¶¶ 6–
7.
77 The chart depicting the legal training provided to IDF officers was created
by the IDF School of Military Law and given to the Authors by the IDF.
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The Minister of Defense appoints the Military Advocate General,
a General officer in rank, based on the IDF Chief of General Staff’s
recommendation. A Military Justice Law designates the MAG as
legal adviser to the Chief of General Staff and other senior military
authorities.78 Although subordinate to the Chief militarily, he is
technically “subordinate” only to the law. His decisions bind the
IDF on operational law issues, including those related to targeting,
and must be implemented. In matters of law regarding IDF
operations, the MAG answers only to the Attorney General.79 This
is an exceptional degree of authority over legal matters. For
instance, legal opinions of judge advocates in the U.S. system do not
bind those involved in the targeting process, although, of course,
commanders and others who disregard the advice of their judge
advocates do so at their own peril.
Independence from the operational command structure is
mirrored throughout the MAG Corps. Unlike many other countries,
including the United States, the chain of command for IDF lawyers
lies solely within the MAG Corps. Of special significance is the fact
that MAG officers are not subordinate to the military commanders
they support during combat operations. Instead, they report to the
International Law Department and ultimately the MAG.80 This
structure, at least in theory, affords them objectivity and
independence when providing legal advice to commanders and
others regarding targeting.
The near-total separation of MAG officers from the operational
chain of command is striking. In the U.S. armed forces, judge
advocates providing legal advice on targeting matters are typically
assigned to the unit conducting or overseeing the strikes and report
to the commander thereof. Unit membership is seen as enhancing
their effectiveness in the fast-paced, high-stress, and deadly
targeting environment. JAGs are considered team members who
contribute to the commander’s goals while ensuring the operations
remain within legal bounds, rather than outsiders who monitor
operations. Thus, commanders and other operators generally feel
as comfortable being open with “their” lawyers as with any other
78 SCO 2.0613, supra note 71, at ¶ 4; The Military Justice Law, 4715–1955, 9 LSI
184 (4714-1955/56 as amended) (Isr.), art. 178.
79 SCO 2.0613, supra note 71, at ¶ 9(a).
80 SCO 2.0613, supra note 71, ¶ 10.
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staff officer. This serves to offset the fact that the decisions of U.S.
JAGs do not bind their commanders.
IDF lawyers appear not to benefit to the same extent as their U.S.
counterparts from this dynamic. Additionally, the Authors found
the degree of confidence of the commanders interviewed, including
a commander of a ground targeting cell, in their own ability to
understand and apply the LOAC in one of the world’s most complex
operational environments somewhat surprising.
Obviously,
commanders need to command and must have a firm grasp of the
law to do so effectively. The Authors nevertheless concluded that
IDF commanders would benefit from a better grasp of the
contribution MAG officers can make to mission accomplishment at
all levels of warfare.
By being outside the operational chain of command, MAG
officers are more immune to the periodic inclination to tell the
commander “what he wants to hear.” If such pressure arises, it is
positive in the sense that the “boss” is a lawyer who will assess the
officer on the basis of his or her effectiveness in rendering legal
advice, including the accuracy of legal assessments. Moreover, the
Israeli system incentivizes following the MAG officer’s advice.
Since the MAG is less an adviser than a staff officer who renders
binding legal decisions, IDF commanders have no option but to
follow the advice of their lawyers. In the event of disagreement in
the field or Air Force Headquarters, the commander may elevate the
issue up the chain of command. But, ultimately the MAG’s decision
is, subject to the Attorney General’s oversight, final. This system
contributes to compliance with the law even in situations in which
doing so might be counter-intuitive from an operational
perspective.
A further benefit of the stove-piped nature of IDF legal advice is
that since MAG officers report up MAG channels, the commander
can expect that potential LOAC violations will be promptly
reported; in other words, the system incentivizes, rather than
disincentives, the reporting of questionable incidents. Commanders
cannot be oblivious to this reality. Obviously, the MAG’s right to
initiate investigations makes such reporting particularly
meaningful.
The MAG Corps enjoys a great deal of authority over, and
responsibility for, investigations and prosecutions of those
suspected of LOAC violations. In light of the recent accession of the
Palestinian Authority to the Rome Statute, the timeliness and quality
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of this process is of critical importance due to the principle of
complementarity, which may provide an effective shield against
International Criminal Court prosecution of Israeli military
personnel.81
Unlike the U.S. military, in which military law enforcement
officials and specified commanders perform investigative and
judicial oversight functions, albeit with the advice of judge
advocates, the MAG operates autonomously. As a result, in part, of
the 2013 Turkel Commission report into the IDF’s procedures for
investigation and prosecution of LOAC violations, the IDF system
has been recently revised.82 Information regarding possible LOAC
violations must be forwarded to the MAG. The MAG has three
options at that point. First, he may decide there is no basis for
suspicion that criminal activity has occurred and close the case.
Second, the MAG may conclude there is reason to suspect that the
incident involved a LOAC violation and direct a criminal
investigation. The investigation’s results are provided to the MAG,
who then must decide to close the case, to forward the results to the
command for disciplinary measures, or to indict those involved.
Third, the MAG may employ a new procedure, the Fact Finding
Assessment (FFA) Mechanism.83 The purpose of the FFA is to
81 The principle of complementarity is enshrined in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court art. 17, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter
Rome Statute], which requires the ICC to find a case “inadmissible” if a State with
competent jurisdiction over the offenses has investigated and prosecuted the case,
or (having investigated) has made an affirmative decision not to prosecute.
82 The Prime Minister appointed the Turkel Commission in June 2010 to
examine a May 2010 incident involving a Turkish vessel that had been forcefully
boarded by the IDF in order to enforce its blockade of Gaza. Although the
Commission generally sanctioned the system in its first report, the Commission
continued its work to specifically address “whether the mechanism for examining
and investigating complaints and claims raised in relation to violations of the laws
of armed conflict . . . conforms with the obligations of the State of Israel under the
forces of international law.” See Turkel Commission Report, supra note 71, at ¶ 13.
Accordingly, the Commission issued a second report in February 2013, which made
a number of recommendations, some of which have been implemented.
83 See Fact-Finding Assessment: Operation Protective Edge, OFFICIAL BLOG ISRAEL
DEFENSE FORCES (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.idfblog.com/blog/2014/09/12/idfconducts-fact-finding-assessment-following-operation-protective-edge/ (detailing
how exceptional incidents examined by the FFA are instances where the MAG
requires additional informal to determine if there are reasonable grounds for a
violation.) See also Decisions of the IDF Military Advocate General Regarding
Exceptional Incidents that Occurred during Operation Protective Edge – Update No. 2,
OFFICIAL BLOG ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (Dec. 7, 2014), http://www.law.idf.il/163-
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conduct a speedy review of incidents using expeditious procedures
to assess whether there may be grounds to suspect a criminal
violation meriting further action by the MAG. If the MAG
concludes, based on initial reports, that a violation of LOAC may
have occurred but wants to clarify the situation before ordering a
criminal investigation, he may direct an FFA. The FFA teams, which
are led by a Major General and include primarily high-ranking
reservist officers with operational and legal backgrounds, examine
the circumstances of an incident (even as operations are on-going),
albeit neither in the same depth as a criminal investigation, nor
using formal criminal investigatory procedures. Based on the FFA
report, the MAG may close the case, send the report to the command
to take disciplinary measures, or direct that a criminal investigation
be opened.84

6958-en/Patzar.aspx (providing further detail on FFA investigations by listing
specific exceptional instances in question.)
84 Information supporting the diagram depicting the investigations process
was provided to the Authors by the IDF.
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With respect to Operation Protective Edge, the MAG has, as of
March 22, 2015, directed 126 FFAs. Sixty-five have been completed.
Of the remaining 61 cases, the MAG has closed 17 reviews, criminal
investigations were ordered following 6 assessments, and 38
examinations remain underway.85 Unfortunately, the MAG has
been criticized for these efforts on the basis that IDF soldiers are
often conscripts with no choice but to serve in the military and that
it is unfair to subject them to investigation and prosecution.86 Such
criticism is off-base from a practical point of view because a welldisciplined army is always more effective than an ill-disciplined
one. It also runs counter to the commitment to the rule of law
professed by Israel.
Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of legal involvement in IDF
operational matters is Israeli judicial scrutiny of ongoing operations.
In most other countries, including the United States, judicial branch
oversight of the executive branch’s’ military activities, especially in
the midst of an armed conflict, is rare. To the extent such oversight
exists, it usually occurs post factum and is seldom a consideration for
field commanders engaged in combat operations.
By contrast, the Israeli Supreme Court sitting as the High Court
of Justice has the power to issue decisions on the lawfulness of
particular tactics.87 This authority is especially significant given the
85 IDF Military Advocate, Decisions of the IDF Military Advocate General
regarding Exceptional Incidents during Operation ‘Protective Edge - Update No. 3 (Mar.
22, 2015), http://www.law.idf.il/163-7183-en/Patzar.aspx.
86 See Associated Press, Israeli Military Divided Over Gaza War Probes, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan.
6,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/01/06/world/
middleeast/ap-ml-israel-war-probes.html?_r=0 (describing the disagreement
within the Israeli military over whether or not to hold soldiers legally responsible
for their actions in the hostilities in the Gaza war); Amos Harel, Preempting The
Hague: How the IDF Seeks to Avoid International Legal Action, HAARETZ (Jan. 3, 2015),
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.635021 (looking at how the
IDF is using internal procedures to try to preclude international legal action against
its soldiers).
87 When the Supreme Court sits as the High Court of Justice (“HCJ”), it
hears petitions brought against government actions. It is a court of first and last
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Israeli judicial system’s liberal approach to standing which extends,
for instance, to public petitions by human rights organizations such
as the Association of Civil Rights in Israel and B’Tselem. The
Supreme Court exercises this power regularly. It has, for example,
rendered numerous decisions regarding detention,88 outlawed the
use of neighbors to warn residents of homes in which terrorists are
about to be arrested,89 dealt with weapons such as artillery,90
flechettes,91 and white phosphorus,92 and addressed the demolition
of homes of those suspected of terrorist activities.93
instance. Jurisdiction of the “HCJ” is provided for in section 15 of the Basic Law:
Judiciary, 5744-1984, 38 LSI 101 (1984) (Isr.). According to the Israeli doctrine of
standing, individuals may petition the court when they can show that conduct by
the executive branch denies them a legally protected right., HCJ 8091/14 Center for
the Defence of the Individual et al. v. Minister of Defense et al. [2014]. Since Israel’s
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, the “HCJ” has reviewed actions of
the military authorities in these territories. A Palestinian first brought a petition
against the West Bank’s military commander in Stekol v Minister of Defence on 20
June 1967 (unreported). The Attorney-General did not challenge the assertion of
jurisdiction. See generally Meir Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in the
Administered Territories, 1 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 262 (1971). Christian Society for the Holy
Places is the first reported decision dealing with the legality of military actions in
the occupied territories. HCJ 337/71 Christian Society for the Holy Places v.
Minister of Defense [1971]. There the issue of jurisdiction was not raised. Id. Access
to the Court for residents of the occupied territories comports with the general
eradication of limitations on standing during the 1980s. See, e.g., HCJ 910/86 Major
(res.) Yehuda Ressler, Advocate et al v. Minister of Defence [June 12, 1988]
(recognizing an exception to the general rule requiring petitioner to establishment
“an interest of the past of the petitioner”). Indeed, the Court no longer requires a
petitioner to demonstrate a direct interest infringed by the disputed government
conduct; it is sufficient that a public interest is implicated. Id. The possibility of
appearing before the Court based on a public interest has led to frequent petitions
by Israeli non-governmental organizations such as B'Tselem. See generally YOAV
DOTAN, LAWYERING FOR THE RULE OF LAW: GOVERNMENT LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF
JUDICIAL POWER IN ISRAEL 34–37 (2014).
88 HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. IDF Commander in the West Bank 15 Isr. L. Rep. 173
[Feb. 5, 2003] (Isr). See also CA 6659/06 A and B v. State of Israel 2008 Isr. L. Rep.
273 [Mar. 5, 2007] (Isr) (holding that, in an appeal against the decisions of the TelAviv-Jaffa District Court, the detention of the appellants under the Internment of
Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002 was lawful).
89 HCJ 3799/02 Adalah - The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel
v. GOC Central Command, IDF [June 23, 2005].
90 HCJ 3261/06 Physicians for Human Rights v. Minister of Defense [2011].
91 HCJ 8990/02 Physicians for Human Rights v. Doron Almog - O.C. Southern
Command [Apr 27, 2003].
92 HCJ 4146/11 Yoav Hess et al v. Chief of Staff [May 13, 2013].
93 HCJ 8091/14 HaMoked - Center for the Defence of the Individual v. Minister
of Defense [Mar. 12, 2014].
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In some cases, the Supreme Court acts while operations are
underway. For instance, it considered a petition filed during
operations in Gaza seeking relief regarding such matters as the
supply of electricity, food, water, and medical supplies, evacuation
of the wounded, burial of the dead, permission for doctors to enter
Gaza, and investigation of the alleged shelling of a civilian crowd.94
In another case, as operations to put an end to rocket fire from Gaza
were still ongoing, the Court examined claims that there were delays
in evacuating the wounded to hospitals in Gaza and that the IDF
was attacking ambulances and medical personnel.95 Perhaps most
well-known is the so-called Targeted Killing case, in which the
Court examined preventive strikes in Gaza and the West Bank
against individuals planning, launching, or committing terrorist
attacks and set forth various guidelines for conducting
individualized anti-personnel strikes.96
It must be emphasized that the Supreme Court’s review is not
pro forma. On the contrary, the Court often rejects government
arguments, sometimes ruling against the government altogether. An
illustration of this point involved using neighbors to warn residents
of homes where arrests were about to occur. In its judgment, the
Court held that “the ‘Early Warning’ procedure is at odds with
international law. It comes too close to the normative ‘nucleus’ of
the forbidden, and is found in the relatively grey area (the
penumbra) of the improper.”97 It held as such on multiple grounds,
including the prohibition on using an occupied territory’s
population for military purposes, the requirement to separate
civilians from military activities, the probability that the actions of
the neighbors was non-consensual, and the risk to neighbors who
convey the warnings.98 Similarly, in another case involving the
policy of demolishing or sealing the homes of terrorists, the Court
elected not to find the policy unlawful, but cautioned that it is such
an exceptional measure that bringing the issue before the judiciary

94 HCJ 4764/04 Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in Gaza 2004
Isr. L. Rep. 200 [May 30, 2004].
95 HCJ 201/09 Physicians for Human Rights v. Prime Minister of Israel 2009
Isr. L. Rep. 1 [Jan. 19, 2009].
96 HCJ 769/02 The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The
Government of Israel 2006 (2) Isr. L. Rep. 459 [Dec. 14, 2006].
97 Id., at ¶ 25.
98 Id., at ¶ 24.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss1/3

2015]

TYRANNY OF CONTEXT

93

on a recurring basis to ensure the continued validity of the claim of
its deterrent effects would be appropriate.99
The risk is that such judicial activism will have a chilling effect
on military operations. However, in the unique circumstances in
which Israel finds itself, particularly the use by its enemies of
lawfare (the use or abuse of the law by a party to the conflict in order
to disadvantage the enemy),100 such activism arguably makes
operational and strategic good sense. After all, the IDF is unlikely
to be defeated on the battlefield, but Israel does struggle to maintain
domestic and international support, which can erode quickly if
Israel is perceived to be acting unlawfully. As former President of
the Court, Justice Aharon Barak, has noted,
Israel is not an isolated island. It is a member of an
international system . . . . The combat activities of the IDF
are not conducted in a legal void. There are legal norms –
some from customary international law, some from
international law entrenched in conventions to which Israel
is party, and some in the fundamental principles of Israeli
law – which determine rules about how combat activities
should be conducted.101
Finally, the Authors met with a number of senior IDF
commanders to discuss targeting operations. It was apparent that
they were highly sensitive to the reality of lawfare. In planning and
executing strikes, the commanders and other operators understood
the extent to which their opponents have adopted strategies and
tactics designed to bait them into strikes that, lawful or not, can be
portrayed as LOAC violations to the broader community. For this
and other reasons (including operational and policy reasons),
commanders sometimes refrain from conducting attacks that would
HCJ 8091/14, supra note 93, at ¶ 28.
The term “lawfare” was coined by Major General Charlie Dunlap, USAF
(ret.), former Deputy Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Air Force. See Charles J.
Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st
Century Conflicts, (Humanitarian Challenges in Military Intervention Conference
Working Paper), http://people.duke.edu/~pfeaver/dunlap.pdf (using “lawfare”
to describe international laws that may be undercutting the ability of the United
States to conduct effective military interventions); Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare
Today…and Tomorrow, 87 INT’L L. STUD. SER. US NAVAL WAR COL. 315 (2011)
(defining “lawfare” as the strategy using or abusing the law in place of traditional
military means to achieve warfighting objectives).
101 HCJ 4764/04, supra note 94, at 391.
99

100
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be both lawful and in accordance with the rules of engagement.
Indeed, although the Authors were not permitted to view the
classified rules of engagement, it was clear from their discussions
with IDF officers that the ROE often include attack thresholds that
are more restrictive than allowed by the law. Commanders and
other operators have noticeably internalized the fact that even a
slight deviation from the dictates of the LOAC is not only risky
personally in light of MAG Corps oversight and authority, but also
operationally insensible. This makes IDF commanders remarkably
open to heeding the advice of the MAG officers involved in their
operations.
5. IDF POSITIONS ON TARGETING LAW
The first step in any LOAC analysis is typically to determine
whether a particular situation constitutes either a non-international
or international armed conflict.102 If it is neither, international
human rights law and applicable domestic legal regimes will govern
hostilities. With respect to the two forms of armed conflict, the
former refers to hostilities between a State and one or more
organized armed groups, or between organized armed groups, that
exhibit a particular level of intensity,103 whereas the latter
102 For a concise discussion of conflict classification, see Jelena Pejic, Status of
Armed Conflicts, in PERSP. ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 77 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Susan Breau eds., 2007). See also
Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 32 (Elizabeth
Wilmshurst ed., 2012) (exploring the distinction between international and noninternational armed conflicts); Sylvain Vité, Typology of Armed Conflicts in
International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations, 91 INT’L REV.
RED CROSS 69 (2009) (discussing how the different categories of armed conflict can
be interpreted in light of recent developments in international legal practice by
proposing a typology of armed conflicts from the perspective of international
humanitarian law).
103 Art. 3 common to GC’s I–IV, supra note 74 [hereinafter Common Article 3
or CA3]. A non-international armed conflict involves “protracted armed violence
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groups within a State.” Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT–94–1–I, Decision on
Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tadić, Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction]. See also Rome Statute, supra note 81, at art. 8(2)(f) (“[O]ther serious
violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an
international character” applies to “armed conflicts not of an international character
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encompasses conflict between two or more States.104 Although the
specific LOAC rules that pertain in the two forms of conflict vary to
an extent, it is generally accepted that the bulk of those governing
attacks apply in both. This is a particularly important point in the
Israeli context because Israel’s position on the nature of the armed
conflicts in which it has recently been involved is unclear. For
instance, no Israeli legal advisor the Authors interviewed was
willing to definitively state whether the 2014 conflict in Gaza was
international or non-international in character.105
Like the United States, Israel is not a party to the 1977 Additional
Protocol I, the treaty that codifies the core principles of targeting
However, most of its provisions reflect customary
law.106
international law that is binding on Israel. Israel is also party to a
number of other treaties that govern various aspects of targeting
practice.
These include, inter alia, the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions;107 the Conventional Weapons Convention Protocols
on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), Mines, Booby Traps and
Other Devices (Protocol II, as amended) and Blinding Laser
Weapons (Protocol IV);108 the Geneva Gas Protocol;109 and the
and thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature.”);
Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgement, para. 87, 135170 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005) (“The Chamber is also conscious of
Article 8 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) which, inter alia,
defines, for its purposes, war crimes committed in an armed conflict not of an
international character.”); Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-A,
Judgement, para. 49 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008)
(listing factors that have bearing on the intensity of hostilities).
104 Art. 2 common to GC’s I–IV, supra note 74. See also Tadić, Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, supra note 103, at para. 70 (“[A]n armed conflict exists
whenever there is a resort to force by States.”).
105 See Iain Scobbie, Gaza, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF
CONFLICTS 280 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012) (discussing the difficulty of
classifying Israeli operations against Hamas in Gaza).
106 AP I, supra note 74.
107 Israel became a party to all four conventions 6 Aug. 1951. GC I, GC II, GC
III, and GC IV, supra note 74; Id.
108 Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168
(Israel became a party on March 22, 1995); Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps, and Other Devices, May 3, 1996,
2048 U.N.T.S. 93 (Israel became a party on Oct. 30, 2000); Protocol on Blinding Laser
Weapons, Oct. 13, 1995, 1380 U.N.T.S. 370 (Israel became a party on Oct. 30, 2000).
109 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous,
or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Jun 17, 1995, 26 U.S.T.
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Hague Cultural Property Convention.110 The International Law
Department also confirmed that Israel considers the provisions of
the 1907 Hague Convention IV Annexed Regulations as customary
law, a position consistent with the findings of the Nuremberg
International Military Tribunal111 and International Court of
Justice.112
The basic contours of the law of targeting are well accepted.113
Attacks may only be directed at military objectives, combatants,
members of organized armed groups, and civilians who are directly
participating in the hostilities,114 and they may not be
indiscriminate.115 Such attacks must be proportionate in the sense
that the expected collateral damage is not “excessive” in relation to

571, reprinted in 14 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 49 (1975) (Israel became a party
on Feb. 20, 1969).
110 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 (Israel became a party on Oct. 3, 1957).
111 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal,
Nuremberg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, vol. I, 1947, pp 253-54.
112 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, 257-58 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Case]; see also Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, UN
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), ¶ 35, available at http://www.
refworld.org/docid/3ae6af0110.html (noting that Hague Convention IV has
“beyond doubt become part of customary international law.”).
113 See generally William H. Boothby, The Law of Targeting 139 (2012); Ian
Henderson, The Contemporary Law of Targeting: Military Objectives,
Proportionality and Precautions in Attack Under Additional Protocol I 215 (2009);
Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting in Operational Law, in The Handbook of the Law of
Military Operations 245–275 (Terry Gill & Dieter Fleck eds., 2010); Geoff Corn &
Gary Corn, The Law of Operational Targeting: Viewing the LOAC through an Operational
Lens, 47 Tex. Int'l L.J. 337 (2012); Michael N. Schmitt & Eric Widmar, “On Target”:
Precision and Balance in the Contemporary Law of Targeting, 7 J. Nat’l Security L. &
Pol’y 379–409 (2014); Michael N. Schmitt & Christopher Markham, Precision Air
Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 89 Int’l L. Stud. 669 (2013); Geoff Corn & Gary
Corn, The Law of Operational Targeting: Viewing the LOAC through an Operational Lens,
47 Tex. Int'l L.J. 337 (2012); Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting in Operational Law, in The
Handbook of the Law of Military Operations 245–275 (Terry Gill & Dieter Fleck
eds., 2010). See also JP 3–60, supra note 61, at app. A (discussing the basic principles
of the laws of war and legal considerations of targeting).
114 AP I, supra note 74, at arts. 48 and 51(3); CIHL Study, supra note 75, at r. 3,
4, 6, 7.
115 AP I, supra note 76, at art. 51(4); Department of the Navy & Department of
Homeland Security, NWP 1–14 M/MCWP 5-12/CMODTPUB P5800.7A, The
Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (2007), ¶ 5.3.2
[hereinafter NWP 1–14]; CIHL Study, supra note 75, at ch. 3.
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the military advantage anticipated to accrue to the attacker.116 Even
when an attack is directed at a lawful target and the results are likely
to comply with the rule of proportionality, an attacker must
undertake feasible measures to minimize harm to civilians.117
As with most legal regimes, the devil is in the details. Despite
universal acceptance of the aforementioned principles, their precise
interpretation and application has generated occasional
disagreement and controversy.
The discussion that follows
highlights these “fault lines” in the law of targeting and, to the
extent the IDF was willing to express one, catalogues the IDF’s
position thereon. As will become apparent, IDF legal positions are
generally mainstream.
5.1. Additional Protocol I as Customary Law
Although not a Party to the instrument, Israel regards many of
the provisions of Additional Protocol I, including most of those
governing targeting, as customary in character.118 Unfortunately,
and like the United States, it has never issued a definitive article-byarticle summary of its position on the Protocol. However, the
International Law Department did offer comment on a number of
provisions that it deems binding only on the Parties to the treaty.
Interestingly, in most cases Israel’s position on a particular
provision tracks that of the United States, at least to the extent that
the U.S. position is known publically.119
116 AP I, supra note 74, at art. 51(5)(b); NWP 1–14, supra note 117, at ¶ 5.3.3;
CIHL Study, supra note 75, at r. 14.
117 AP I, supra note74, art. 57(2); NWP 1–14, supra note 115, ¶ 8.3.1; CIHL Study,
supra note 75, at ch. 5.
118 CIHL Study, supra note 75, at chs. 1–6 (ICRC sets forth those general
targeting principles and rules that it deems customary). See generally Michael N.
Schmitt, Targeting, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 131–168 (Susan Breau & Elizabeth Wilmshurst
eds., Cambridge University Press, 2007).
119 Michael J. Matheson (then Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State),
Remarks in Session One: The United States Position on the Relation of Customary
International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM.
U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 419 (1987) (An unofficial, but generally deemed authoritative,
summary of the U.S. views on Additional Protocol I as customary international law.
Cites NWP 1–14, supra note 115, as the illustration of the position of a State that is,
like Israel, not a Party to Additional Protocol I).
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Israel does not find the two provisions on the protection of the
natural environment to be customary in character. The first, Article
35(3), prohibits the employment of methods or means of warfare
(tactics and weapons) that are “intended, or may be expected, to
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment.” A related provision, Article 55(1), prohibits the use
of methods or means of warfare that may be expected to cause such
damage and “thereby prejudice the health or survival of the
population.” The distinction between the two provisions is subtle.
Article 35(3) protects the environment as such, whereas the latter is
anthropocentric in that it protects humans from negative effects on
the environment.120 The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian
Law study takes the position that the rule is customary in nature,
although it labels the United States a “persistent objector.”121
As to Israel, the study states that the country report prepared on
Israeli practice as part of the project noted that the IDF does “not
utilize or condone the use of methods or means of warfare which are
intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and
severe damage to the environment.”122 In interviews with senior
MAG officers, however, it was clear that Israel does not view the
Additional Protocol I provisions as customary in nature. Israel’s
concern is that the prohibitions are absolute; so long as the requisite
threshold of harm is crossed, an operation is unlawful irrespective
of its importance.
Admittedly, that threshold is very high, especially in light of its
cumulative character. As a general matter, therefore, the prospect
of military operations generating such effects is low. Yet in the
Middle East, some States rely heavily on oil production and export,
making them, as illustrated during the “Tanker War” of the 1980s123
and the 1990-1991 Gulf War, attractive targets. The region is home
to a number of fragile ecosystems, especially in the Persian Gulf, that
are highly vulnerable to environmental harm, such as that which
inevitably results when oil facilities and transports are attacked.
Therefore, while the provision may be of only peripheral
120 Michael N. Schmitt, Green War: An Assessment of the Environmental Law of
International Armed Conflict, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 70–71 (1997).
121 CIHL Study, supra note 75, at commentary accompanying r. 44.
122 CIHL Study, supra note 75, at commentary accompanying r. 45.
123 See generally George K. Walker, The Tanker War, 1980–1988: Law and Policy,
74 INT’L L. STUD. 33 (2000).
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significance to many States, the Authors were of the view that for
Israel it looms large.
Israel believes that the environment is indirectly protected by
the rule of proportionality, which prohibits “an attack which may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.”124 In this context, Israel takes an anthropocentric view
regarding damage to the environment; it does not consider the
natural environment to be an object, as that term is understood in
the LOAC.125 Rather, damage to the environment is only relevant to
the extent it jeopardizes the health of civilians (by way of air
pollution, drinking water pollution, etc.) or damages civilian objects,
and then it will indeed factor into proportionality assessments. To
illustrate, an attack against the environment itself, such as a release
of oil into the Persian Gulf without military rationale, would not be
a prohibited attack on a civilian object. Rather, it would be assessed
based on any harm it causes to civilians or civilian objects. The
Israeli approach would require an attacker to attempt to avoid
environmental damage that produces collateral effects on civilians
or civilian objects when conducting an attack by, for instance,
considering the use of different weapons or tactics or other targets
that might yield a similar desired effect on the enemy, in order to
comply with the requirement to take precautions in attack.126
This position differs from that of the United States127 and the
Authors, who hold that the environment is an object, and thus harm
to the environment as such is directly factored into proportionality
calculations, together with any harm to civilians and civilian objects.
In other words, in the event of collateral damage to the environment
or environmental damage that incidentally harms civilians, a strike
causing widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural
environment will be lawful if such harm is not excessive to the
124 AP I, supra note 74, at arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b); NWP 1–14, supra
note 115, at ¶ 8.3; CIHL Study, supra note 75, at r. 14.
125 NWP 1–14, supra note 115, at ¶ 8.3 (“Civilian objects are all objects which
are not military objectives as defined in” Additional Protocol I, art. 52.2, AP I, supra
note 74, at art. 52(1)); CIHL Study, supra note 75, at r. 9.
126 AP I, supra note 74, at art. 57(2)(a)(ii); NWP 1–14, supra note 115, at ¶ 8.1;
CIHL Study, supra note 75, at ch. 5 (more fully developing the application of the
requirement to take precautions in attack).
127 NWP 1–14, supra note 115, at ¶ 8.4.
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military advantage likely to accrue to the attacker. By the same
token, even if the harm to the environment resulting from an attack
falls well below the threshold, the strike will be prohibited if the
military advantage of the operation is itself low enough to render
the collateral environmental damage excessive.
To illustrate these various approaches, consider the Iraqi release
of oil into the Persian Gulf and the setting ablaze of five–hundred
Kuwaiti oil wells during the 1990-91 Gulf War.128 Some states
focused on whether the harm caused by these actions qualified as
widespread, long-term, and severe.129 For the United States, the
relevant question was whether the expected harm to the
environment from the oil and smoke was excessive relative to
anticipated military advantages, such as leveraging smoke as an
obscurant against air attack or using oil to foul engines of any boats
used in an amphibious assault. For Israel, by contrast, the relevant
question would have probably been whether the release of oil could
have been expected to cause excessive harm to the civilian
population or civilian objects.
Israel also rejects characterization of the Additional Protocol I’s
rule on perfidy as fully reflecting customary law. Article 37(1)
provides that “it is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an adversary
by resort to perfidy.” It defines perfidy as acts that invite “the
confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled
to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international
law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that
confidence.”130 The classic example is an individual who dresses as
a civilian in order to get close enough to the adversary to attack
without raising suspicion. The prohibition applies only if the act is
motivated by a desire to exploit feigned protective status in order to
wound, kill or capture; merely wearing civilian clothes does not
implicate the prohibition, even when conducting attacks.
The ICRC’s Customary International Humanitarian Law study
claims that the prohibition is customary in nature.131 There is
universal consensus that the customary law prohibition includes
128 U.S. Department of Defense Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf
War – Appendix on the Role of the Law of War, 31 ILM 612, 636–37 (1992) [hereinafter
Gulf War Report].
129 The debate was merely illustrative of the threshold issue because Iraq did
not become a party to Additional Protocol I until 2010.
130 AP I, supra note 74, at art. 37(1).
131 CIHL Study, supra note 75, at r. 65.
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feigning protected status in order to wound or kill the enemy, that
is, to conduct “attacks,” a term of art in the LOAC.132 However,
Israel does not recognize feigning protected status in order to capture
as perfidy.133 Its position is supported by the fact that treacherous
killing or wounding was proscribed in Article 23 of the Hague
Regulations, a treaty that, as noted above, is considered to set forth
norms that are today customary.134 Only in Additional Protocol I
was the prohibition extended to acts intended to capture the enemy.
Indeed, the Rome Statute, which was adopted nearly a quarter
century after Additional Protocol I, omits capture in its rendering of
the war crime.135 Recent manuals prepared by international groups
of experts as restatements of the LOAC likewise omit any reference
to capture in their rules.136
In light of the fact that Israel’s enemies have a strategic objective
of capturing individual members of the IDF, it is somewhat curious
that Israel maintains fidelity to a formalistic analysis of the law of
perfidy, unless it wishes to employ the tactic itself to capture
members of the enemy forces. The United State’s most recent
military manual, the 2007 Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval
Operations, states that “[i]t is a violation of the law of armed conflict
to kill, injure, or capture the enemy by false indication of intent to
surrender or by feigning shipwreck, sickness, wounds, or civilian
status.”137 However, the annotated version of an earlier manual
132 AP I, supra note 74, at art. 49 (defining “attacks” as “acts of violence against
the adversary, whether in offence or in defence”). See Sean Watts, Law-of-War
Perfidy, 219 MIL. L. REV. 106 (2014) (discussing perfidy generally).
133 See Ido Rosenzweig, Combatants Dressed as Civilians?: The Case of Israeli
Mista’arvim under International Law, THE ISRAEL DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE POLICY PAPER
8E, 45–49 (2014) (discussing capture as perfidy in the Israeli context).
134 Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to
Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 23, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227 [hereinafter Hague Regulations] (making it “especially
forbidden . . . to kill or wound [treacherous] individuals belonging to the hostile
nation or army.” Capture is not addressed.).
135 Rome Statute, supra note 81, at art. 8(2)b)(xi). See MICHAEL N. SCHMITT,
CHARLES H.B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NONINTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT: WITH COMMENTARY, ¶ 2.3.6 (International
Institute of Humanitarian Law, 2006) (omitting capture in its rule on perfidy).
136 AMW Manual, supra note 63, at r. 111(a); Prepared by the International
Group of Experts at the invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre
of Excellence, Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber
Warfare r. 60 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter Tallinn Manual].
137 NWP 1–14, supra note 115, at ¶ 12.7.
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containing the same provision cites to Hague Regulations Article
23(b) and Additional Protocol I Article 37(1) as authority.138 In light
of the fact that Article 23(b) makes no mention of capture, the U.S.
reference to capture appears questionable as a strict matter of
customary law. Even still, it would seem to be a sensible approach
that will lend itself to the process of crystallization as a customary
norm.
Israel has a number of undercover units (Mista’arvim) that are
active in the West Bank and Gaza. These include the IDF’s Duvdevan
and the Israeli Border Police’s Yamas.139 So long as the members
thereof are not wearing civilian attire for the express purpose of
conducting attacks, their operations are not perfidious. At least by
the Israeli position, with which the Authors agree as a matter of law,
it may do so in order to capture individuals whose capture is
permissible under LOAC.
Like the United States,140 Israel opposes a number of other
articles that do not directly affect its targeting operations,
particularly Articles 1(4) and 44(3). The effect of the former is to
extend the reach of Additional Protocol I, and by reference
international armed conflict, to situations in which “peoples are
fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of selfdetermination . . . .” It is unclear whether Israel objects on the same
basis as the United States, that including conflicts with national
liberation movements, a term lacking precision, within the ambit of
international armed conflict “would undermine the principle that
the rights and duties of international law attach primarily to entities
that have those elements of sovereignty that allow them to be held
accountable for their actions and the resources to fulfill their
obligations.”141 This is so because in the Targeted Killing case the
Israeli Supreme Court applied the law governing international
138 Annotated Supplement to the Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval
Operations, 73 INT’L L. STUD. 514 (1999), n.23 [hereinafter ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT to
NWP 1–14]. But c.f. Matheson, supra note 119, at 425 (including “capture” in his
unofficial explanation of those provisions of AP I that the U.S. deems customary).
139 See ROSENZWEIG, supra note 133, at 23–24 (summarizing the creation of
special undercover units as a response to failures to suppress guerilla-styled attacks
against civilians).
140 Matheson, supra note 119, at 425.
141 Abraham D. Sofaer, The Position of the United States on Current Law of War
Agreements, 2 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 460, 463 (1987) [hereinafter Sofaer].
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armed conflict to situations involving non-State actors in which the
conflict “crosses the borders of the state,” as is the case of the West
Bank and Gaza.142 Further, MAG officers confirmed that uncertainty
exists as to whether the recent conflict in Gaza was of an
international or non-international character. However, whatever
the basis of the Israeli objection, Israel definitely objects to
application of the Article 1(4) approach. Although not directly
bearing on the issue of Israeli targeting, note that the Israeli position
deprives members of national liberation movements of any
belligerent immunity for their attacks on Israeli targets, including
those that qualify as military objectives.
Article 44(3) allows combatants to retain combatant status, and
therefore belligerent immunity, even when wearing civilian clothes
during an attack so long as they carry their weapons openly when
deploying to, from, and during an engagement. The United States
has objected that the provision’s application will result in “increased
risk to the civilian population within which such irregulars often
attempt to hide.”143 In light of the extent to which Israel’s enemies
have adopted this tactic to frustrate IDF targeting, Article 44(3) is
equally objectionable to Israel.
Interestingly, the IDF lawyers would not express an opinion on
the customary nature of Additional Protocol I prohibitions on
reprisals, that is, unlawful actions (including attacks) taken to
compel the other side to desist in its own unlawful acts. There is
general acceptance that the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol I prohibitions on reprisals (or other unlawful
actions) against prisoners of war, interned civilians, civilians in
occupied territory or otherwise in the hands of an adverse party to
the conflict (and their property), those who are hors de combat, and
medical personnel, facilities, vehicles, and equipment are customary
in character.144 But the Additional Protocol I, Article 51(6) and 52(1),
prohibitions on reprisals against civilians and civilian objects
respectively are not universally seen as customary in nature. Even
some States that are Party to the instrument have set forth
understandings restricting its application,145 and when preparing
Targeted Killings Case, supra note 96, at ¶ 18.
Sofaer, supra note 141, at 463.
144 See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 136, at r. 46, cmt. 4 (demonstrating
the views of the International Group of Experts that prepared the manual).
145 See, e.g., MINISTRY OF DEF., JSP 383, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW
OF ARMED CONFLICT, ¶ 16.19.1 (2004) [hereinafter UK MANUAL] (outlining the
142
143
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the Customary International Humanitarian Law study, the ICRC
refrained from asserting that the Articles had achieved customary
status.146 It would be surprising, therefore, if Israel adopted the
position that the two provisions have crystallized into customary
law. Instead, the Authors speculate that the IDF reticence to offer a
view on the matter reflects the extreme sensitivity of the issue
generally and Israel’s unique susceptibility to lawfare specifically.
5.2. Military Objectives
Like most militaries, the IDF accepts as reflective of customary
law the Additional Protocol I, Article 52(2), definition of military
objectives:
In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are
limited to those objects which by their nature, location,
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military
action and whose partial or total destruction, capture or
neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers
a definite military advantage.147
Military objectives may be directly attacked, and any damage to
them that collaterally occurs during an attack on another military
objective has no bearing on the proportionality and precautions in
attack analyses.148
In the Israeli context, the “purpose” and “use” criteria are
especially important. A civilian object becomes a military objective
whenever used for military ends, however slight the use (beyond a
de minimis level).149 For instance, when Hamas uses a civilian
United Kingdom’s opposition to certain obligations with respect to Articles 51–55
of the Additional Protocol).
146 CIHL Study, supra note 75, at r. 145-48; Id. at r. 146, cmt.
147 Id., at r. 8. See also NWP 1–14, supra note 117, at ¶ 8.2, (delineating what can
and cannot be attacked as military objectives).
148 See generally AGNIESZKA JAHEC-NEALE, THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY OBJECTIVES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TARGETING PRACTICE (2015) (Routledge Research in the
Law of Armed Conflict) (exploring generally the objectives associated with war).
149 As an example of de minimis usage, one senior Israeli legal adviser spoke of
a Hamas military leader who makes a single phone call from a building. The
building does not become a military objective, although, of course, the individual
is targetable.
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residence as a command center, a school as a weapons storage
facility, or the roof of a hospital as a location from which to launch
rockets, these buildings become military objectives subject to attack
by operation of the use criterion —without prejudice, of course, to
the various LOAC requirements such as providing a warning to
desist before an attack on a misused hospital may proceed.150
Application of this well-settled law in the Israeli context is
sometimes difficult for outside observers to grasp. Consider tunnel
construction as an example. IDF intelligence has identified a specific
configuration of concrete supports that are manufactured in Gaza,
the sole purpose of which is to support Hamas military tunnels. If
accurate, the factory producing them is unquestionably a military
objective, although a strike on the factory may be perceived as an
The law may be
unlawful attack on a civilian object.151
unambiguous in its acceptance of this practice, but perceptions
matter in a lawfare-intense environment.
Another issue that often surfaces in reviews of Israeli targeting
practices is attacking non-military government buildings.152 MAG
officers interviewed stated that the IDF does not target such
buildings based on the fact that they are used for government
activities. Instead, the officers asserted that government buildings
are, like any other buildings, only attacked when used for military
activities or when members of the enemy force are inside. In the
latter case, the individuals are the targets, not the building itself.
Damage to the building is factored into the proportionality analysis
described below as collateral damage if it is merely a location at
which the enemy is coincidentally present.
GC I, supra note 74, at art. 21.
Compare Tova Dvorin, IAF Gaza Strike Targeted Hamas Terror Tunnel
Construction, ARUTZ SHEVA (Dec. 20, 2014), http://www.israelnationalnews.com/
News/News.aspx/188883 (containing Defense Minister Ya’alon’s defense of a
recent IDF strike on these grounds), with “I Lost Everything:” Israel’s Unlawful
Destruction of Property During Operation Cast Lead, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 2010),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iopt0510webwcover_1.pdf
(noting that Israel damaged many of Gaza’s ready mix concrete factories despite
the fact that the Human Rights Watch says “[t]here is no evidence that any of the
cement and concrete factories in Gaza contributed to the military efforts of
Palestinian armed groups during the fighting”).
152 See B’Tselem to Attorney General Mazuz: Concern Over Israel Targeting Civilian
Objects in the Gaza Strip, B’TSELEM (Dec. 31, 2008), http://www.btselem.org/
gaza_strip/20081231_gaza_letter_to_mazuz (complaining to the Attorney General
about IDF targeting practices of which B’Tselem is a frequent critic).
150
151
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In the view of the Authors, this analytical framework would
logically include police facilities. If the enemy’s police forces are
operating as a unit against the IDF, the unit may be treated as an
organized armed group (see below) and its facilities therefore
qualify as military objectives. However, if members of the police are
involved in hostilities merely on an individual basis, a police station
only becomes a military objective while used for military purposes.
Controversy has surrounded attacks on media facilities for well
over a decade. This issue surfaced most prominently during
Operation Allied Force, the 1999 NATO air campaign against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Among the airstrikes was one
against a Serbian radio and television station in Belgrade that
resulted in civilian casualties. The Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia investigated the
incident and decided not to pursue prosecution,153 although it did
form the basis for the well-known Bankovic litigation before the
European Court of Human Rights.154
When queried on media facilities as a target, the International
Law Department stated it supported the approach taken in the wellknown Final Report to the Prosecutor on the NATO bombing
campaign. The report states:
[T]he attack appears to have been justified by NATO as part
of a more general attack aimed at disrupting the FRY
[Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] Command, Control and
Communications network, the nerve centre and apparatus
that keeps Milosević in power, and also as an attempt to
dismantle the FRY propaganda machinery. Insofar as the
attack actually was aimed at disrupting the communications
network, it was legally acceptable.
If, however, the attack was made because . . . the station was
part of the propaganda machinery, the legal basis was more
debatable. Disrupting government propaganda may help to
undermine the morale of the population and the armed
forces, but justifying an attack on a civilian facility on such
grounds alone may not meet the "effective contribution to
153 INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, FINAL REPORT TO THE
PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW THE NATO BOMBING
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA ¶91 (2000), available at
http://www.icty.org/sid/10052#IVB3 [hereinafter Final Report to the Prosecutor].
154 Bankovic v. Belgium, 123 Eur. Ct. H.R 335, 371 (2001).
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military action" and "definite military advantage" criteria
required [in the definition of military objectives]. . . . It
appears, however, that NATO’s targeting of the RTS
building for propaganda purposes was an incidental (albeit
complementary) aim of its primary goal of disabling the
Serbian military command and control system and to
destroy the nerve system and apparatus that keeps Milosević
in power . . . .
Assuming the station was a legitimate objective, the civilian
casualties were unfortunately high but do not appear to be
clearly disproportionate.155
Based on this report, it may be concluded that, for the IDF, a
media facility becomes a target only when used for military
purposes. Such purposes do not include propaganda or inciting
anti-Israeli fervor. It does not even include enhancing enemy
morale since, according to the report, such a contribution to military
action is too remote to qualify a broadcast station as a military
objective. Israel’s approach to this matter is quite conventional.
A number of situations the IDF faces are less settled. Of
particular note is the long-standing debate in the LOAC community
over so-called “war-sustaining” military objectives. There is
universal agreement that objects that are “war-fighting,” such as
rockets, and those that are “war-supporting,” like a facility in which
home-made rockets are produced, qualify as military objectives.
However, the United States has taken the position that objects that
provide the financial basis for conducting an armed conflict also
qualify.156 The classic contemporary example is the oil export
industry of a country that relies on export profits to fund its war
effort.157 Based on this war-sustaining approach, oil production,
refining, storage, and shipment facilities upon which the export
industry relies qualify as military objectives.
Israel’s recent enemies engage in few production activities that
would qualify objects as military objectives on this basis. However,
an unusual issue has surfaced in the context of financing. Because
of the economic situation, the lack of access to banking and funds
Final Report to the Prosecutor, supra note 153, at ¶¶ 75–77.
NWP 1–14, supra note 115, at ¶¶ 8.2., 8.2.5.
157 ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO NWP 1–14, supra note 138, at 403 n.11 (using
cotton export during the American Civil War as an example).
155
156
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transferring capabilities, and the nature of the transactions involved,
much of the economic activity supporting the military operations of
organized armed groups fighting Israel occurs on a cash basis. Cash
is used to buy weaponry, pay fighters, and the like. In a sense, the
cash “sustains” the war effort. This reality raises the question of
whether the IDF may target the money when Israeli intelligence
agencies physically locate it?
By the war-sustaining approach, it would seem arguable that the
cash is a targetable military objective so long as a clear nexus can be
established between it and the military wing of Hamas, Hezbollah,
or other organized armed groups. It does not matter whether it is
designated for any particular purpose, so long as there is a reliable
indication that it is destined to support an armed group. This is the
view of one of the Authors.
Those who reject the war-sustaining approach, including the
other Author, would require that there be clear evidence that the
cash is going to be used to support military operations per se, as in
purchasing weapons or explosives. In such cases only, the money
would qualify on the basis of being “war-supporting.” It would not
suffice that the funds are going to be used to sustain the enemy’s
overall war effort in the general sense.
The MAG officers with whom this was discussed did not
indicate whether the IDF had taken a firm position one way or the
other on the issue. However, it and both of the Authors agreed that
once the cash is physically transferred to an armed group, it qualifies
as a military objective by nature. Similar to the way that the money
held by the military finance section of a regular armed force qualifies
as a military objective by nature, it is used solely for the purposes of
the armed force and without which it would be difficult for the force
to operate.
There are a number of ongoing debates regarding application of
the concept of military objectives regarding which the IDF would
not offer a view. For instance, consider the case of two buildings in
close proximity. Actionable intelligence exists that one of them is
being used for military purposes that necessitate a strike, but it is
unclear which is being so used. It would appear that there are two
options. The first is to strike both knowing that one is a military
objective; by this approach, damage to the other and any occupants
thereof must factor into the proportionality and precautions in
attack analyses. Because it is unknown which of them is the military
objective, the one that will suffer the least collateral damage must be
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treated as if it is the military objective for proportionality rule
purposes. The second view is that absent definitive information that
verifies the use of one of them in particular, both must be presumed
to be civilian and therefore the attack may not proceed because an
attack is being directed at at least one civilian object. Although the
MAG officers consulted were unwilling to take a position on this
very realistic scenario, they did indicate that the sensitivity of such
a situation would generally lead—for policy, if not legal, reasons—
to a decision to refrain from attack.
They were also unwilling to articulate the IDF’s position with
respect to major lines of communication. The debate concerns
whether main roads, railways, and similarly important avenues of
transportation qualify as military objectives by “nature” or by
“purpose or use.” If the former analysis is made, the lines of
communication may be struck at any time irrespective of whether
they are being, or going to be, used for military transportation.
Conversely, if lines of communication qualify as objectives only by
purpose or use, then they may only be struck when so used or when
the intention to use them manifests. The Authors take the latter
view, but were unable to pin the MAG officers down on this point.
It is a particularly important issue in southern Lebanon, where lines
of communication are critical to Hezbollah’s ability to maneuver
and be resupplied during hostilities.
With respect to Gaza operations, the most important lines of
communication are tunnels. The legal analysis of tunnels as military
objectives is somewhat sharper. As tunnels running from Gaza into
Israel have only military functions, the IDF treats them as military
objectives by nature. They are used solely for the transit of fighters
and weapons into Israel and for the exfiltration of captured IDF
personnel and Israeli civilians, thus enabling the tunnels to be
targeted at any time.
By contrast, the tunnels to and from Egypt are sometimes used
exclusively for civilian activities like smuggling, sometimes only for
military undertakings, and sometimes for both purposes. Unless
used in an exclusively military manner, they must be treated as
civilian objects that become military objectives only when used for
military ends, most notably smuggling rockets into Gaza. Dual use
tunnels that serve both purposes on a regular basis are, like any
other dual-use object, military objectives. Additionally, tunnels not
currently being used for military ends may become targetable if
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reliable intelligence surfaces that they are likely to be so used in the
future.
5.3. Persons on the Battlefield
Israel takes the traditional binary approach to qualifying
persons on the battlefield. They are either members of the armed
forces or civilians. This dichotomy is, however, subject to
controversial nuances regarding civilians who in some fashion take
part in the hostilities. Members of the armed forces may be targeted
at any time; in other words, their susceptibility to attack derives
solely from their status, which provides the basis for so-called
“status-based targeting.” Civilians are not subject to attacks based
on status. Instead, pursuant to Additional Protocol I, Article 51(3),
civilians who “take a direct part in hostilities” lose their civilian
protections during an international armed conflict only “for such
time” as they so participate. An analogous rule applies during a
Thus, their targetability
non-international armed conflict.158
depends on their engagement in acts that qualify as “direct
participation” and expires once they desist in the participation. In
addition to losing protection from direct attack while they
participate, they are not to be treated as civilians with respect to rule
of proportionality calculations or the requirement to take
precautions in attack. These general rules are well accepted as
reflecting customary law.159
The topic of direct participation was considered by a group of
international experts between 2003 and 2008 convened at the
invitation of the International Committee of the Red Cross.160 When
the group could not reach a consensus, the ICRC released its own
report on the subject as The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of
Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian
Law.161
AP II, supra note 74, at art. 13.3.
CIHL Study, supra note 75, at r. 10. See also, e.g., NWP 1–14, supra note 115,
at ¶ 8.2.2 (indicating the U.S.’s position that civilians serving in certain roles are
subject to hostile attack as unlawful combatants).
160 One of the Authors participated as an expert.
161 Compare Nils Melzer, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance
on the Notions of Direct Participation Under International Humanitarian Law 41–
68 (2009) [hereinafter ICRC Interpretive Guidance] (describing the ICRC’s position
158
159
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A major sticking point in the deliberations was the meaning of
the phrase “for such time.” Applying a restrictive interpretation,
Article 51(3)’s plain text seemed to imply that members of an armed
group fighting a State may be attacked only while they are engaged
in combat or performing a combat related activity. This is in contrast
to the general rule that all members of a State’s armed forces are
targetable around the clock regardless of their duties. The
interpretation of 51(3) advanced by the ICRC in their 2008
Interpretive Guidance, which the United States and other States
reject, clearly favored non-State groups, an incongruous result in
light of the LOAC’s foundational balancing of humanitarian
considerations and military necessity.162
As the ICRC project was underway, the Supreme Court of Israel
issued its 2006 opinion on the matter in the Targeted Killing case.163
The Court held that Article 51(3) reflected customary law in its
entirety.164 It also held that a civilian who participates in the
hostilities “does not lose that status,” only the protections associated
on existing international humanitarian law), and Nils Melzer, Keeping the Balance
Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J.
Int’l L. & Pol. 831, 914 (2010) (arguing that that Interpretive Guidance is actually the
best balance of all considerations in war), with W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC
“Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally
Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 769, 829–30 (2010) (claiming that Part IX of the
Interpretive Guidance is legally incorrect and inappropriate); Michael N. Schmitt,
Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements, 42 N.Y.U.
J. Int’l L. & Pol. 697, 738 (2010) (claiming that the Interpretive Guidance does not
have the best argument about civilian or temporal participation in hostilities);
Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in
Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 Harv. Nat’l Security J. 5, 6–7 (2010) (arguing that the
internal divisions in writing the Interpretive Guidance led to a completely flawed
ultimate document); Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and
the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L.
& Pol. 641, 693–95 (2010) (opining that the ICRC Interpretive Guidance has failed
in its goal of protecting civilians in war and applying international humanitarian
law).
162 See generally Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in
International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795
(2010) (exploring the balance between military expediency and humanitarian
principles in war and how effective current International Humanitarian Law is at
balancing the two).
163 HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. Gov’t 2006 v. 2 Isr. L. Rep. 459
(2006).
164 Id. at 501. See also Aerial Strikes against Terrorists: Some Legal Aspects, ISR. DEF.
FORCE MIL. ADVOC. GENERAL CORPS, available at: http://www.law.idf.il/592-6584en/Patzar.aspx (reviewing rules of aerial strikes undertaken by the IDF).
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with it while so participating.165 But with regard to the “for such
time” issue, the Court held that:
[A] civilian who joins a terrorist organization that becomes
his home, and within the framework of his position in that
organization he carries out a series of hostilities, with short
interruptions between them for resting, loses his immunity
against being attacked “for such time" as he is carrying out a
series of operations. Indeed, for such a civilian the rest
between hostilities is nothing more than preparation for the
next hostile act.166
In other words, members of groups like those fighting Israel
were to be treated as direct participants while they were engaged in
a series of acts amounting to direct participation in hostilities, even
when not engaging in such acts at the moment of attack.
The Interpretive Guidance took a different approach to resolving
the impasse. Borrowing a concept from elsewhere in the LOAC, it
characterized members of “organized armed group[s]” as “armed
forces,” not civilians, for targeting purposes.167
By this
interpretation, the “for such time” caveat does not apply to members
of organized armed groups, and they are thus subject to statusbased targeting. However, the ICRC went on to limit this
characterization to members of the group who have a “continuous
combat function,” that is, duties that affect the enemy’s combat
capabilities or one’s own.168 This restriction has proven highly
controversial.169
The IDF remains fully committed to the Israeli Supreme Court's
judgment in the Targeted Killings case, and it applies the guidelines
laid down by the Court whenever targeting civilians taking a direct
part in hostilities. At the same time, the ongoing armed conflict in
which Israel is engaged has increasingly illustrated the extent to
which the groups it faces have become highly organized and combat
effective. Furthermore, the notion of organized armed groups as
HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture 2006 v. 2 Isr. L. Rep. at 494–95.
Id. at 501–02.
167 ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 161, at 31–32.
168 Id. at 33–36.
169 See, e.g., Bill Boothby, “And for Such Time As”: The Time Dimension to Direct
Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 741, 767–77 (2010) (criticizing
the ICRC Interpretive Guidance as being far too restrictive with respect to the
timing of acts of war).
165
166
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armed forces for targeting purposes, which had its genesis in the
ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance (published after the Targeted Killings
judgment was rendered), is now generally accepted as reflecting
customary international law. Accordingly, the IDF believes it is
more accurate to characterize certain groups, such as Hamas'
military wing (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades), as armed forces
rather than as assemblages of civilians directly participating in the
conflict. The IDF thus accepts the notion of “organized armed
groups” and relies on it in its targeting operations. This position has
yet to be tested in the Supreme Court but, as with other sensitive
matters of legal policy, has been vetted through the inter-agency
process and approved by senior officials in the Ministry of Justice.
Although now embracing the ICRC’s organized armed group
approach, the IDF has not followed suit with respect to the concept
of continuous combat function (“CCF”). MAG officers noted that
the CCF criterion creates a legal imbalance. For instance, it would
countenance the targeting of a MAG officer uninvolved in targeting
matters but not a lawyer serving in an identical role on the other
side. The same would be true of IDF public affairs officers, finance
officers, or others removed from direct involvement in the
hostilities. The IDF therefore rejects the concept on the basis that it
is neither an aspect of treaty law that binds Israel nor does sufficient
State practice or opinio juris exist to support the concept’s
characterization as customary law. In the view of the Authors, the
IDF is on very firm ground in rejecting the CCF concept.
Despite that rejection, the IDF does accept the premise that
groups may consist of both military and non-military wings. All
members of military wings, such as Hamas’ Izz al-Din al-Qassam
Brigades, are targetable at all times in the Israeli view. Yet, so long
as the wings are clearly distinct and the non-military wing engages
in no activities that contribute to the hostilities in any meaningful
way, the IDF treats the non-military wing members as civilians who
may only be targeted if and when they directly participate in the
hostilities. The IDF considers the leader of groups comprising both
military and nonmilitary wings to be a lawful target when that
individual’s duties include command and control of the military
wing’s activities; the fact that the individual also leads the civilian
activities of the group does not affect this determination.
As important as the issue of when an individual may be targeted
is that of whether the conduct he or she is engaging in qualifies as
direct participation in the hostilities. The MAG has issued a list of
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activities that meet this definition. The list is classified, but MAG
officers interviewed acknowledged that preparing rockets for
launch, launching rockets, and retreating from the location of a
rocket launch all qualify.170 MAG officers likewise indicated that
religious leaders who harangue Israel and its policies are not
considered direct participants. Neither are those individuals who
generally incite violence, recruit for enemy organizations, or
provide broad financing for enemy operations. Like the Authors,
however, they opined that recruiting for a particular operation, as in
recruiting a suicide bomber to attack a particular target, is direct
participation, as is providing the supplies or financing for that
specific operation. As a general matter, the IDF’s position is that the
greater the nexus between the act and a particular military
operation, the more appropriate it is to characterize the activity in
question as direct participation.
It would, of course, be impossible for the list to contain all
possible forms of direct participation. Therefore, if the commander
of an Attack Cell believes an individual is directly participating but
the activity concerned does not appear on the list, the commander
may elevate the matter to higher authorities for authorization to
strike. Those authorities will enjoy legal advice when making their
determination.
It is clear that the IDF, like the U.S. armed forces, takes a broader
view of acts that qualify as direct participation than set forth in the
Interpretive Guidance. As an example, the Guidance labels the
production and transport of weapons and equipment as indirect
participation “unless carried out as an integral part of a specific
military operation designed to directly” harm the enemy.171 By this
standard, civilians who are assembling, storing, and transporting
rockets meant to attack Israel retain their protection from attack.
Further, if the rockets they are associated with are attacked as
military objectives, any harm to those individuals is a factor in the
proportionality and precautions in attack analysis that attends the
170 In the Targeted Killing case, the Supreme Court described direct
participation as including armed civilians on their way to use those arms against
the enemy, those armed civilians returning from such engagements, individuals
who collect intelligence for military purposes, persons who transport unlawful
combatants to or from the hostilities, weapons operators, and those who supervise
the use or service of weapons. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture 2006 v. 2 Isr.
L. Rep. at 496–50.
171 ICRC Interpretive guidance, supra note 161, at 53.
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strike. This position is styled by proponents as analogous to the
generally accepted view that workers in a munitions factory are
civilians who continue to enjoy their protected status despite an
activity that plainly contributes to the conflict. Along the same lines,
if members of an organized armed group carry them out, the
activities do not amount to a continuous combat function that would
permit targeting the individuals based solely on membership in the
group.
Israel and the Authors view such activity as direct participation
in hostilities. This is both a principled position and a practical one
in light of the fact that rockets pose a threat to Israel’s civilian
population, are built in or near the battle area, and are the weapon
with the greatest potential for bringing those who use it success in
the conflict (however success might be defined). To conclude
otherwise would ignore the military necessity element underlying
the LOAC and, quite simply, be illogical in light of the reality of the
conflicts Israel faces. Interestingly, the MAG officers asked would
not offer an opinion on whether individuals transporting weapons
through the tunnels into Gaza are directly participating in
hostilities. Both of the Authors would readily conclude they are so
participating on the basis of the proximity to the area of combat and
the immediacy of the use of the weapons.
5.4. Human Shields
The IDF regularly confronts the use of human shields by its
enemies.172 According to Additional Protocol I, Article 57(7),
[T]he presence or movements of the civilian population or
individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points
or areas immune from military operations, in particular in
attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to
shield, favour or impede military operations. The Parties to
the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian
172 See, e.g., Captured Hamas Combat Manual Explains Benefits of Human Shields,
THE OFFICIAL BLOG OF THE ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.
idfblog.com/blog/2014/08/04/captured-hamas-combat-manual-explainsbenefits-human-shields/ (citing a Hamas instructional manual on the benefits of
shielding); Michael N. Schmitt, Human Shields and International Humanitarian Law,
47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 292 (2009) (discussing human shields generally).
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population or individual civilians in order to attempt to
shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military
operations.
Violation of the prohibition by the enemy, however, does not
relieve an attacker of the requirement to take the presence of
civilians into consideration when performing proportionality and
precautions analyses.173
Although most States, including the United States and Israel,174
accept these provisions as reflecting customary law, the
interpretation thereof has been the source of significant controversy
since it was highlighted during the Interpretive Guidance project.175
The project’s debate surrounded the distinction between individuals
who voluntarily shield a target, as when individuals go to a target
in order to shield it from attack, and those who shield involuntarily,
as in the case of weapons placed in a school occupied by students
and teachers unaware of the presence of the weapons. Israel has
faced both situations. For instance, the IDF often warns individuals
in a building to be attacked to leave the facility. In some cases,
Hamas responds by urging people to come to the target area in order
to deter the Israeli attack. More commonly used is the practice of
conducting military activities, such as launching rockets, from the
top of, or next to, inhabited buildings, like apartment complexes and
schools.176
Although the dispute over the treatment of human shields is
complex,177 a review of its broad outlines will suffice here. With
AP I, supra note 74, at art. 51(8).
See NWP 1-14, supra note 115, at ¶ 8.3.2 (“A party to an armed conflict has
an affirmative duty to remove civilians under its control . . . from the vicinity of
objects of likely enemy attack.”)
175 ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 161.
176 Human Rights Watch, a frequent critic of Israeli military operations,
nonetheless has also pointedly complained about Hamas’ use of densely populated
urban terrain to mask its rocket attacks. Gaza: Palestinian Rockets Unlawfully Targeted
Israeli Civilians, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 24, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/
2012/12/24/gaza-palestinian-rockets-unlawfully-targeted-israeli-civilians
(“Human Rights Watch research in Gaza found that armed groups repeatedly fired
rockets from densely populated areas, near homes, businesses, and a hotel,
unnecessarily placing civilians in the vicinity at grave risk from Israeli counterfire.”).
177 ICRC Interpretive guidance, supra note 161, at 56–57; see also generally
Michael N. Schmitt, Human Shields and International Humanitarian Law, 47 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 292 (2009).
173
174
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respect to involuntary shields, Israel adopts the majority view that
involuntary shields retain all civilian protection. An attacker may
not directly attack them, it must consider their presence when
making proportionality calculations, and it has to take feasible
precautions to avoid harming them. If it is unclear whether the
person shielding is acting voluntarily or involuntarily, Israel will
presume that the shielding is involuntary. An alternative view that
they lose protection because the enemy should not be entitled to
benefit from its unlawful behavior has nearly faded away. A slight
variant of the latter approach that is also on the wane is that
although the involuntary shields do not lose all protection, the harm
to them is somehow “discounted” when making the proportionality
calculation.178
A persistent debate still surrounds the use of voluntary shields.
There are two diametrically opposed positions. The ICRC is of the
view, embraced by some LOAC experts, that civilians only lose their
protections for such time as they are physically blocking or
otherwise physically shielding a military objective, as in blocking a
bridge over which troops need to pass or shielding enemy forces
that are attacking by moving forward in front of them.179 In such
cases, their shielding amounts to direct participation in hostilities.
However, in all other cases of voluntary shielding, the civilian
retains the full protection of civilian status.
This is not the opinion of Israel or, for that matter, the United
States or the Authors.180 Israel, in a position set forth by the Supreme
Court in the Targeted Killing case,181 believes that characterizing
voluntary shielding as direct participation in hostilities better
reflects the balancing of humanitarian considerations and military
necessity that permeates the LOAC. The logic underlying this
stance is difficult to counter. After all, by the competing approach,
an enemy population could effectively shield military objectives as
a matter of law simply by gathering enough civilians on or near the
178 For instance, this is the view held by Yoram Dinstein. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE
CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 155
(2d ed., 2010).
179 ICRC Interpretive guidance, supra note 161, at 56–57.
180 The U.S. view acknowledges that the law is unsettled, but that voluntary
human shields “may also be considered to be taking a direct part in hostilities or
contributing to the enemy’s warfighting/war-sustaining capability, and may be
excluded from the proportionality analysis.” NWP 1-14, supra note 115, at ¶ 8.3.2.
181 HCJ 769/02, supra note 96, at ¶ 36.
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target to render the likely collateral damage excessive relative to the
military importance of the target. Indeed, in an asymmetrical
conflict in which one Party can, like Israel, conduct air or artillery
attacks with relative impunity, the tactic may be significantly more
effective than the use of defensive weapon systems. This is certainly
the case with respect to operations in Gaza and, to a lesser extent,
southern Lebanon.
Of course, the same dynamic attends the use of involuntary
shields, but a different balancing of humanitarian considerations
and military necessity is at play. In the case of involuntary shields,
a Party to the conflict is placing the civilians at risk in order to
enhance its military position. That Party should not be permitted to
deprive civilians of the protections to which they are entitled under
the LOAC. By contrast, during voluntary shielding, the individuals
concerned are taking the actions that may result in loss of their
civilian protections.
The LOAC already acknowledges the
possibility of such loss in the case of voluntary physical acts of direct
participation in hostilities such as gathering tactical intelligence or
conducting attacks. To allow voluntary human shields to affect
military operations by exploiting the law would be to admit of a
distinction without a meaningful difference in terms of either
humanitarian considerations or military necessity.
The preceding analysis of shielding is purely legal. Although
the IDF would not disclose its actual operational approach to
situations involving shielding because doing so would enable its
enemies to more effectively employ the tactic, it is fair to say that the
IDF approach is much more restrictive than allowed by the law. In
particular, MAG officers did not refer to any situation in which
physical shielding is not involved that would merit direct targeting
of the shields themselves (as distinct from the entity they are
shielding).
An issue that has recently surfaced involves the refusal of
civilians to leave the target area following warnings of attack. For
instance, during Operation Protective Edge Israel warned Gaza’s
population of pending attacks and not only directed it to evacuate
to areas where no attacks would occur, but also identified routes to
get there that would be safe from on-going military operations.
While many civilians heeded the warnings, some did not. Indeed,
Hamas actively encouraged the civilian population not to evacuate.
On a smaller scale, warnings of individual attacks were also
sometimes disregarded.
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It has been suggested that civilians who do not heed warnings
should either be treated as voluntary human shields directly
participating in hostilities or, the fact that they choose to remain in
the target area should somehow be factored into the proportionality
calculations and precautions in attack requirements.182 The IDF
rejects these arguments. Civilians have no LOAC obligation to leave
the target area and thus do not forfeit any of their legal protection
when remaining there. As a practical matter, they place themselves
at risk of becoming injured or killed incidentally, but that is their
choice. The Authors agreed that this position, albeit problematic
from a military standpoint, reflects customary international law.
Issuing the warning may help satisfy Israel’s obligation to take
precautions in attack as described below, but declining to heed the
warning certainly does not result in the forfeiture of protection,
absent other acts that constitute direct participation.
5.5. Placement of Fighters and Military Objectives In or Near Civilian
Facilities
It is very common for Israel’s enemies to use civilian facilities for
military purposes or to shield their operations. The law is clear in
such cases. When used for military purposes, a civilian facility
becomes a military objective “by use,” irrespective of the degree of
use. Thus, all so-called “dual-use” targets, that is, those used for
both military and civilian purposes, qualify as military objectives.
Examples include storage of weapons in a school, use of a mosque
as an observation point, using civilian apartments as command and
control locations, and physically shielding military equipment,
personnel and activities from attack with civilian structures.183 If
reliable intelligence exists that it will be employed for military
182 This assertion was discussed, for example, at a recent conference attended
by one of the Authors and conducted under the Chatham House Rule.
183 See, e.g., UNRWA strongly condemns placement of rockets in school, UNRWA
(July
17,
2014),
http://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/press-releases/
unrwa-strongly-condemns-placement-rockets-school
(condemning
groups
responsible for hiding weapons in a school); UNRWA condemns placement of rockets,
for a second time, in one of its schools, UNRWA (July 22, 2014),
http://www.unrwa.org/
newsroom/press-releases/unrwa-condemnsplacement-rockets-second-time-one-its-schools (condemning the same a second
time).
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purposes in the future, a civilian entity becomes a military objective
“by purpose” and may be attacked even before the conversion
occurs.
These rules are set forth in the aforementioned Article 52(2) of
Additional Protocol I and are universally considered to be
customary, including by Israel.184 Whether converted from civilian
status by the use or purpose criterion, any expected damage to the
entity concerned is not collateral damage in the proportionality
sense and need not be considered with respect to precautions in
attack. It must be cautioned that damage to unmistakably distinct
aspects of an entity that has been converted in part to military use is
collateral damage.
A persistent problem for the IDF is that Hamas and other
organized armed groups sometimes use an apartment, floor, or
particular section of a building for military purposes while the
remainder is occupied by civilians or otherwise used for civilian
purposes. This raises the question of which parts of the building
have been converted into a military objective and therefore do not
factor into proportionality calculations or precautions in attack
considerations. In particular, if the IDF has the precision capability
to strike a single apartment or floor within a building that is being
used by the enemy, does any expected damage to the rest of the
structure qualify as collateral damage?
MAG officers to whom this question was posed were quick to
distinguish law from policy. As a matter of law, the IDF treats the
building as a single object such that no damage to it is legally
considered collateral damage. For instance, if an airstrike is planned
on an apartment on the third floor, but is expected to damage
apartments used for civilian purposes on the floors beneath it, the
expected damage need not be factored into any proportionality
analysis, nor need measures be taken to avoid causing it pursuant to
the precautions in attack requirement. By this position, an attack on
a building used for military purposes is lawful (subject to
proportionality) even if the IDF does not know which apartment is
being so used. At the same time, the MAG officers indicated that
whenever such situations presented themselves, the IDF sought to
avoid any damage to the components of the target that are not being
used for military purposes, including by employing, whenever
184 NWP 1–14, supra note 115, at ¶ 8.2; CIHL Study, supra note 75, at r. 7 and
commentary accompanying r. 8.
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feasible, precision-guided munitions. Moreover, the IDF often has
refrained from attacking certain multi-story buildings even when
striking them would be permissible as a matter of law.
Note that the position is limited to buildings that are a single
structure. For instance, the fact that two adjacent buildings might
be connected by a walkway does not render them a whole for
targeting purposes. The IDF would also qualify any civilian
property in the building as collateral damage. Likewise, it takes any
harm to civilians into consideration when doing the proportionality
assessment.
One of the Authors would come to a different conclusion. He
would suggest that if an attacker possesses the means of surgically
striking an apartment (or other distinct section of a building) used
for military purposes in a building that is otherwise civilian in
character, and if the use of that means is militarily feasible in the
circumstances, then damage to the civilian aspects of the building
should be included in the proportionality analysis.
This latter position will seldom affect the proportionality
assessment because it only applies when the attacker is in possession
of a precision weapon the effects of which are capable of being
limited to a single apartment, floor, etc. Thus, most collateral
damage to the rest of the building would be unanticipated and
therefore not “expected.” But it would affect choice of weapon
pursuant to the precautions in attack requirement. For instance,
assume a building will be struck at night when no civilians are
present. If the entire facility is a military objective as the IDF
suggests, it would be permissible to use a weapon that would drop
the entire structure; no damage to it would qualify as collateral. Yet,
by the alternative interpretation, if the IDF has a missile that can
feasibly take out only the section of the building being used
militarily, it must be employed to minimize harm to the aspects of
the building that qualify as civilian in nature. The relativity
introduced into the proportionality and precautions in attack
analysis based on the precision capabilities of an attacker parallels
the well-accepted relativity of the precautions in attack requirement.
Despite this difference of opinion, both Authors found the IDF
position to be reasonable; they also took note of the fact that the IDF
has a policy of limiting the damage that would generally result in
compliance with the more restrictive interpretation.
Such situations must be distinguished from those, frequent in
the Israeli context, in which the enemy leverages the proximity of
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civilian entities that have not been converted into a military
objective by use or purpose. The most common example the IDF
faces today is placement of mobile and other rocket launchers near
civilian residences in the hope that this will either deter attack or
result in collateral damage that can be exploited for lawfare
purposes. In such cases, Israel’s enemies are often violating the
LOAC requirement to segregate civilian and military objects when
feasible.185 Nevertheless, Israel takes the position that any damage
to adjacent civilian property is collateral damage that counts fully in
the proportionality analysis and must be considered with respect to
precautions. The IDF correctly rejects the occasional argument that
the enemy’s unlawful behavior relieves the IDF of its obligation to
consider the damage as collateral damage.186
MAG officers were quick to note that the IDF only attacks a
structure when the enemy is using it for military purposes or when
there is reliable intelligence that it will be so used. A situation that
the IDF often confronts involves a momentary use of a civilian
structure for military purposes. For instance, a mortar may be fired
from the roof of the building, but those firing it flee the building
rapidly so as to avoid the IDF response. Since the building is not
being used for military purposes at the time of the potential strike,
it is no longer liable to attack absent later use or the possession of
intelligence that indicates with a relatively high degree of certainty
that it is going to be used again. In such a case, it would qualify as
a military objective by the purpose criterion.
The exception to this rule is a structure that is repeatedly used
for military purposes. According to the MAG officers interviewed,
frequent repeated use of the same structure for military purposes
will render it a military objective by use throughout the period
involved. The classic example would be a home that is regularly
used by the enemy leadership to plan and coordinate operations. Of
particular note in this regard is criticism of the IDF for attacking the
homes of Hamas leaders.187 The legal validity of the criticism
AP I, supra note 74, at art. 58; CIHL Study, supra note 75, at r. 23–24.
In this regard, note that AP I, supra note 74, at art. 51(8) provides that “[a]ny
violation of these prohibitions shall not release the Parties to the conflict from their
legal obligations with respect to the civilian population and civilians, including the
obligation to take the precautionary measures provided for in Article 57.” NWP 1–
14, supra note 115, at ¶ 6.2.5; CIHL Study, supra note 75, at r. 140.
187 See, e.g., HRW Q&A, supra note 58 (discussing issues related to attacking
Hamas leaders in their homes).
185
186
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depends on whether the home in question is used on a regular basis
to coordinate Hamas military activities. If not, it may only be struck
when the leader is there (the attack would technically be on the
leader). If so, a strike during his absence would be lawful. The
Authors agreed that this approach represented a reasonable
interpretation of the use criterion in the definition of military
objective.

5.6. Uncertainty
Israel wields impressive intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) assets, including human intelligence
(HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), aerial platforms such as
RPAs, cyber capabilities, and other means of verifying a target.
Proximity to Israel eases the operational challenges normally
associated with employing such assets. Just as importantly, the IDF
knows where it is most likely to fight in the near future – Gaza and
Southern Lebanon—and has carefully prepared to do so. It has
operated in and occupied both areas and therefore has first hand
understanding of their physical layout, patterns of life, and cultural
practices.
The IDF and civilian intelligence agencies work
assiduously to maintain this knowledge so as not to be
disadvantaged militarily by virtue of the fact that their forces are
most likely to fight on their enemies’ home turf. At the same time,
such understanding enhances their ability to identify targets and to
distinguish them from civilians and civilian objects.
Nevertheless, uncertainty often permeates the targeting process.
This is especially the case with respect to urban areas such as Gaza
where civilians and civilian objects are collocated with fighters and
military objectives. Moreover, Israel’s opponents, as described
earlier, have adopted a strategy of operating near civilians and
civilian objects and using civilians as human shields, both
voluntarily and involuntarily. This further enhances the degree of
uncertainty attendant to IDF strikes.
The IDF takes a very conservative approach towards
uncertainty. It accepts the Additional Protocol I, Article 50(1),
requirement that “[i]n case of doubt whether a person is a civilian,
that person shall be considered to be a civilian” as reflective of

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

124

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 37:1

customary LOAC.188 With respect to objects, the IDF affords the
same status to the Article 52(3) requirement that “[i]n case of doubt
whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes,
such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is
being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it
shall be presumed not to be so used.”189 Although it does not extend
the presumption to other civilian objects as a matter of law, MAG
officers explained that as a matter of operational and policy good
sense in an environment in which their opponents actively employ
lawfare, the presumption applies as a matter of policy to all
objects.190
The question remains, however, as to the degree of doubt that
triggers these presumptions. Israel applies a “reasonableness”
standard.191 Specifically, would it be reasonable in the same or
similar circumstances, after exhausting militarily feasible measures
to verify the target, to proceed based on the information available
and in the face of any uncertainty that remained? From a practical
perspective, it is perhaps better expressed in the negative as an
assessment of whether the decision to attack is unreasonable; that is,
would a reasonable operator in that situation refrain from launching
the attack? This standard has been adopted by many militaries and
by tribunals reviewing targeting decisions made in the field.192
The standard of reasonableness is sometimes characterized as a
threshold. By this approach, individuals may differ as to whether
sufficient certainty exists to have crossed the threshold of
reasonableness, but the threshold itself is a constant. This approach
seeks to quantify reasonableness. For instance, at a recent
188 See also CIHL Study, supra note 75, at commentary accompanying r. 6
(restating the rule from Additional Protocol I regarding classification as a civilian
in a case of doubt).
189 CIHL Study, supra note 75, at commentary accompanying r. 10.
190 The United States apparently does not view the latter presumption as
customary in nature, although the usually cited basis for this conclusion, the Report
on the Gulf War of 1990-91, is by now quite dated. See Gulf War Report, supra note
128, at 627 (critiquing the presumption on the basis of practical warfare concerns).
See also DINSTEIN, supra note 178, at 98 (stating the presumption that a civilian object
is serving its normally dedicated services, in order to limit exposure to attack).
191 See generally John Merriam, Affirmative Target Identification:
Operationalizing the Principle of Distinction for U.S. Warfighters, 56 VA. J. INT’L L. 1
(forthcoming 2015) (discussing the issue of reasonableness in targeting).
192 Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, ¶ 55 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003); Final Report to the Prosecutor, supra note 155,
at ¶ 50.
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conference, one non-Israeli participant suggested that an attack is
reasonable when it is “more likely than not” that the target is a
military objective.
Although the IDF has taken no express position on this issue, the
Authors would take a different view. For them, the degree of doubt
as to status that renders unreasonable a decision to attack is highly
contextual. In particular, when the anticipated military advantage
is very high, as in the case of attacking an enemy leader or striking
an important weapons storage area, the extent of doubt as to status
that is legally acceptable increases. By contrast, when expected
collateral damage is high, it decreases. Note that although military
advantage and collateral damage are also factors in the
proportionality analysis, here they affect the reasonableness of the
determination that the target selected qualifies as a military
objective or a targetable individual in the first place. Other factors
may also be relevant. For example, if the target is a fleeting one
unlikely to appear again, acceptable doubt increases, whereas if the
target probably can be struck at a later date, the level of certainty
required to render the strike reasonable will climb. Given some of
the similar circumstances the U.S. armed forces and the IDF faces in
this regard, the Authors would be surprised if the IDF disagreed.
5.7. Proportionality
Israel fully accepts the articulation of the rule of proportionality
set forth in Additional Protocol I, which prohibits attacks “expected
to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.”193 The prohibition is especially meaningful for the IDF
given an operational environment that involves an enemy operating
from an urban setting employing tactics such as human shielding,
placement of military objectives and fighters in and near civilian
objects, and adoption of lawfare-motivated operational techniques

193 AP I, supra note 74, at arts. 51, 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b). NWP 1-14, supra note
115, at ¶ 8.3.1; CIHL Study, supra note 75, at r. 14, 18, 19. See IDF Military Advocate
General, Aerial Strikes against Terrorists, supra note 164 (confirming Israel’s
acceptance of the rule).
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intended to draw it into causing civilian casualties and damage to
civilian objects.194
Proportionality is also a major issue because of the sheer
intensity of Israeli campaigns. For instance, during Operation
Protective Edge, which lasted 50 days, the IDF conducted strikes
against nearly 5,000 targets mostly in populated areas of tiny
Gaza.195 During these strikes around 2,100 Gazans were killed.196
Israeli estimates note that around half of those killed were fighters
who would not be factored into the collateral damage assessments
performed for individual attacks.197 It must be cautioned in this
regard that proportionality is assessed ex ante and not post factum;
the legality of a strike with respect to the proportionality analysis is
based on the expected collateral damage and anticipated military
advantage, rather than that which eventuates. But the point is that
a high operational tempo in a small densely populated area lends
itself to the unavoidable causation of collateral damage.
As noted above with respect to identifying a target, Israeli ISR
capabilities are impressive, as is its deep understanding of the target
area and civilian activities therein. This understanding gives it
particular insight into what U.S. targeting experts call “pattern of
life.” In other words, the IDF has an excellent understanding of
when, where, and how civilian activities normally occur in the target
area, and it devotes additional resources to identify, as much as
feasible, changes in these patterns during hostilities. These
capabilities undeniably enhance the accuracy of likely military
advantage and collateral damage estimations during the targeting
process. Additionally, following general warnings to evacuate
zones into which strikes will be conducted, the IDF monitors the
area concerned to assess whether civilians have heeded the
194 Noam Neuman (currently head of the IDF’s International Law
Department), Applying the Rule of Proportionality: Force Protection and Cumulative
Assessment in International Law and Morality, 7 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 79 (2004)
(discussing proportionality from an Israeli perspective).
195 See supra note 12 (reporting statistics on Operation Protective Edge).
196 See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN
AFFAIRS, OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY: GAZA EMERGENCY SITUATION REPORT
(2014), available at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_sitrep_28_08_
2014.pdf (stating that 2,104 Palestinians were killed).
197 Note that proportionality is calculated for individual strikes; it is not
calculated for an entire conflict. It would be technically incorrect to label a
campaign as disproportionate because the expected harm to civilians and civilian
objects is disproportionate.
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warnings to more accurately make the proportionality
determination; this is also true with respect to warnings of
individual strikes.
However, Israeli real time coverage of the target area not
unlimited. In particular, RPA sorties to assess potential collateral
damage in the target area are constrained by the competing need to
search for tunnel entrances and enemy activity within Israel. As a
result, air commanders have to carefully balance the requests for
target area coverage designed to locate targets and monitor civilian
activity against those intended to help protect the IDF and civilian
population from attacks. The ability of IDF Commanders to assess
expected collateral damage is neither absolute nor flawless.
Both Authors were struck by the weight accorded in the
proportionality analysis to the military advantage of protecting the
civilian population and individual soldiers. Although they would
not label it unwarranted in light of the unique operational context in
which Israel finds itself, it was clear to them that avoidance of harm
to the Israeli civilian population and the protection of individual
soldiers loomed large in Israeli proportionality calculations. Two
examples illustrate this sensitivity.
The Iron Dome system has proven highly effective against the
rocket threat to the civilian population.
During Operation
Protective Edge, the Iron Dome system intercepted 95% of the
rockets directed against Israeli population centers. This raises the
question of whether the military advantage gained by targeting
rocket launchers drops when on average a rocket fired on a
trajectory that places a population center at risk has only a mere 5%
chance of striking its target. The effect on the proportionality
calculation would be substantial if this were the case because the less
the military advantage, the lower the lawful collateral damage. The
math would seem unassailable.
Every Israeli government legal adviser with whom the Authors
spoke rejected this approach. They proffered numerous arguments
against it, most of which are reducible to condemnation as overly
formalistic. First, they argue that rocket launchers, launching pads,
and other offensive capabilities of the enemy possess inherent
military value, which is significant enough to warrant a certain level
of collateral damage. Second, they say that a State's efforts to protect
its population should not undermine its ability to diminish its
adversary's offensive capabilities. Third, they argue that the rocket
attacks terrorize the civilian population and that the degree of terror
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does not diminish in parallel with the decreased likelihood of a
missile striking. Restated, the population is not 95% less terrorized
because of Iron Dome’s success rate. Finally, these advisers stress
that the IDF does not overstate the value of rocket launchers, saying
they were unaware of any cases in which civilians lost their lives in
attacks against such launchers. The Authors agreed with the first
three points, but they have no way to confirm the fourth. In
particular, they concurred with the advisers that preventing terror
among the civilian population, as distinguished from fear that is
only incidental to lawful attacks, is a legitimate military objective.
This is so based on the fact that the LOAC prohibits attacks, “the
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian
population.”198
Nevertheless, the Authors were of the view that some decrease
in the degree of terror is likely with improved defenses and that,
accordingly, the military advantage of striking a rocket does
diminish somewhat as the effectiveness of defenses increases. This
approach creates relativity in the proportionality analysis because
those parties to a conflict with the best defenses sometimes will be
estopped by the rule of proportionality from launching attacks that
their less well-defended enemies would be entitled to conduct in the
same circumstances. However, the Authors pointed out that this is
largely a theoretical problem. They also noted that in any event,
relativity is already resident in the LOAC, like the relative
obligations that are inherent in the precautions in attack notion of
feasibility (see below) or the fact that the acceptable degree of
uncertainty as to the status of a target is, as discussed, contextual.
The Israeli perspective is evident in the so-called “Hannibal
Directive,” which is classified. According to open sources, the IDF
promulgated the directive in the aftermath of the 1986 capture of
two soldiers by Hezbollah.199 It is designed to prevent capture –
both out of concern for the soldiers and to deprive the enemy of a
strategic pawn. The Hannibal Directive is mostly technical, setting
forth various procedures for command and control. The only
198 AP I, supra note 74, at art. 51(2); CIHL Study, supra note 75, at r. 2. See also
NWP 1–14, supra note 115, at ¶ 8.9.1.2. (prohibiting “bombardment for the sole
purpose of terrorizing the civilian population;” the limitation of this language to
cases of “bombardment” makes sense in the context of a publication directed at
naval commanders).
199 See Margolit, supra note 33 (explaining the development and purposes of
the Hannibal Directive).
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substantive provision it includes concerns the risk that may be
actively posed to the captured IDF soldier. Essentially, the Hannibal
Directive allows IDF commanders that are seeking either to prevent
a soldier from being captured or to interdict an already-captured
soldier before he vanishes to take aggressive measures including
placing the soldier concerned at risk if necessary. Israeli legal
advisers willing to discuss the directive in broad terms stated that
while it may permit operations that might otherwise not be allowed
under the rules of engagement in force at the time, it does not
dispense with the rule of proportionality or any other LOAC norm.
The fact that a directive relaxes the rules of engagement in these
cases demonstrates the military advantage the IDF attributes to
keeping its soldiers out of enemy hands. Interestingly, at the time
this article was finalized the MAG was assessing a Hannibal
Directive operation that was launched during Operation Protective
Edge for compliance with LOAC and the rules of engagement; this
engagement reportedly resulted in as many as 114 deaths in
Rafah.200
Expressly allowing the imposition of risk on an IDF soldier
illustrates another facet of military advantage in the Israeli context,
the denial of a strategic objective to the enemy, specifically, its desire
to turn the Israeli population against the conflict. As previously
explained, because Israel’s enemies cannot prevail on the
conventional battlefield, the IDF in not in itself a vulnerable center
of gravity. Instead, its enemies asymmetrically target the civilian
population and individual soldiers as alternative critical
vulnerabilities. Therefore, attacking rocket launchers, striking
tunnels, rescuing captured soldiers, and similar activities designed
to protect the population and individual soldiers have to be
considered from the perspective of denying the enemy a strategic
objective rather than a tactical gain. The Authors agreed that it is
appropriate to consider defeat of the enemy’s strategic objectives as
a factor in calculating the military advantage of an attack, so long as
200 See Gili Cohen, Israeli Army Mulling Criminal Probe Into Use of Hannibal
Directive in Gaza, HAARETZ (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.haaretz.com/news/
diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.643111# (reporting on the Israeli Army’s possible
criminal investigation into the Hannabal Directive); Maayan Lubell and Nidal alMughrabi, Did Israel's 'Hannibal directive' lead to a war crime in Gaza?, REUTERS (Oct.
13,
2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/13/us-mideast-gazawarcrime-insight-idUSKCN0I20FN20141013 (describing the casualties and
political effects of the Hannibal Directive).
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the enemy is seeking to achieve said objectives militarily. This
would differentiate it from, for instance, undermining enemy
civilian morale, which is not military advantage in the legal sense no
matter how much it actually affects the course of a conflict.
It is clear that when trying to rescue an individual soldier or
defend in a position where one’s own forces are located, rescue and
survival are factors that are taken into consideration in the military
advantage calculation. This is because the very purpose of the
operation is to achieve those ends. There has been an ongoing
debate for a number of years over the issue of whether survival of
one’s own forces and assets should be included in the military
advantage estimate when defense of one’s forces is not a central goal
of the operation. The classic illustration is an aircraft that, because
it is flying above the threat envelope of enemy surface-to-air
missiles, is more likely to return to base than one flying within the
threat envelope. The question is whether it is appropriate to
consider the pilot and aircraft’s safe return as an element of military
advantage such that the proportionality calculation would
countenance greater collateral damage.201
The IDF takes the position that it is appropriate, as does one of
the Authors.202 The other Author is of the view that avoidance of
risk is primarily a consideration when determining the military
feasibility of precautions in attack as described below.203 For
instance, flying at a lower altitude is a tactic that in some cases will
enable a pilot to verify the target and identify potential collateral
damage with greater accuracy. Yet, the risk of flying within an
enemy air defense system’s threat envelope would usually render
such a tactic militarily infeasible and therefore a measure that need
not be taken irrespective of any proportionality analysis.
MAG officers correctly emphasized that the rule of
proportionality only prohibits an attack when collateral damage is
201 See generally Ian Henderson, The Contemporary Law of Targeting: Military
Objectives, Proportionality and Precautions in Attack Under Additional Protocol I,
203–206 (2009) (providing an excellent discussion of this problem and concluding
that considering the preservation of one’s own forces is appropriate when
determining military advantage in the proportionality context).
202 See Neumann, supra note 194, at 91.
203 Michael N. Schmitt, Precision Attack and International Humanitarian Law, 87
(No. 859) INT’L REV. RED CROSS 445, 462 (2005). See also DINSTEIN, supra note 178, at
141–42 (describing the tension between the LOAC duty to avoid or minimize
damage to civilians and a commander’s military duty to minimize damage to
his/her own troops).
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“excessive” relative to the anticipated military advantage, as should
be apparent from the plain text of the relevant articles in Additional
Protocol I. The reference to “extensive” harm in the ICRC
Commentary is therefore counter-textual.204 Similarly, there is no
basis for an assertion that a strict balancing test applies such that if
expected collateral damage “slightly outweighs” anticipated
military advantage, the strike may not be launched. Nor is
excessiveness a mathematical calculation, as when the number of
civilians harmed exceeds the number of combatants injured or
killed. Rather, excessive “means the disproportion is not in doubt .
. . .”205 This interpretation is supported by addition of the term
“clearly” in the relevant proportionality provision of the Statute of
the International Criminal Court.206
5.8. Precautions in Attack
Even when a strike is directed at a military objective and would
comply with the rule of proportionality, the attacker must take
precautions in attack to verify the target is a lawful military objective
and minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects.
This
requirement is fulfilled by using all feasible means to verify the
target and by selecting the weapons, tactics and targets that can best
avoid causing collateral damage without sacrificing any military
advantage.207
Israel considers this prohibition, captured in Article 57 of
Additional Protocol I, to be customary in nature.208 MAG officers
interviewed by the Authors emphasized the extent to which their
204 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 1980 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski &
Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY]. See also DINSTEIN,
supra note 178, at 131 (distinguishing “excessive” from “extensive” damage).
205 DINSTEIN, supra note 178, at 131.
206 See id. (“ . . . the adverb ‘clearly’ is explicitly added in the Rome Statute.”).
See also Rome Statute, supra note 81, art. 8(b)(iv) (stating that damage which is
clearly excessive in relation to the military advantage expected qualifies as a serious
violation falling under the jurisdiction of the ICC).
207 See Jean-Francois Queguiner, Precaution under the Law Governing the Conduct
of Hostilities, 88:864 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 793 (2006) (discussing the general
precautions required “to avoid, or at least minimize, collateral casualties and
damage”).
208 NWP 1–14, supra note 115, at ¶ 8.1; CIHL Study, supra note 75, at CH. 5.
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operations complied with the requirement to take precautions when
conducting attacks. They cited the fact that over 2,000 “sensitive
sites” were identified in Gaza that were either on a “no strike” list
or that were “restricted” in the sense that an attack against them
required special caution or higher-level approval than would
otherwise be the case.209 Although the lists are classified, the MAG
officers cited mosques as an example of a category necessitating
higher-level approval.
Additionally, the IDF carefully weaponeers each strike. For
instance, during Operation Protective Edge, the vast majority of the
air-delivered weapons were precision-guided munitions (PGMs).
In some cases, the IDF uses weapons that have been specifically
designed with such characteristics as penetration capability, low
blast, no blast (inert) or low fragmentation. The IDF also considers
tactics such as angle of attack, timing of the strike to occur when
civilians are least likely to be in the area, or using weapons set to
explode after burying into the target to minimize the collateral
effects of the blast. As mentioned, RPAs, when available, are used
to verify the target’s status and to track targets to plan attacks when
civilians are least likely to be harmed.
According to IDF operational and legal officers, the IDF also
requires multiple sources to verify a target, except in those
circumstances where its forces are immediately taking fire (a
“troops-in contact” or “TIC” situation). These standards are set
forth in classified standing IDF regulations that delineate the
number and type of source required to verify particular categories
of targets. Although it is rarely done, the standards may be
modified by an Operations Order (OpOrd) for a specific operation
based on the operational environment and objectives, but only when
the individual who approved the regulations or that individual’s
superiors agree.
During Operation Protective Edge, criticism was leveled at the
IDF for its use of artillery in an urban area.210 As the Authors were
Sensitive sites are marked on operational maps used by the IDF.
See Amnesty Int’l, Israel/Gaza: Attack on UN School in Gaza a Potential War
Crime That Must Be Investigated (Jul. 30, 2014), https://www.amnesty.org/en/
articles/news/2014/07/israelgaza-attack-un-school-gaza-potential-war-crimemust-be-investigated/ (noting its position that “it is inevitable that the repeated use
of artillery in densely populated civilian neighbourhoods will lead to the unlawful
killing and injury of civilians and destruction and damage to civilian buildings,
regardless of the intended target.”).
209
210
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unable to visit the area concerned, they can offer no comment on
whether the use violated the requirement to resort to militarily
feasible means of attack to minimize civilian casualties. The Authors
are of the view that there is no LOAC prohibition on using artillery
in urban area; rather, its use is governed by the rule of
proportionality and the requirement to take various precautions in
attack. As an example, it might be used to clear structures of enemy
forces when ground forces are moving into a dense area from which
the civilian population has evacuated, subject—of course—to the
usual rules of LOAC, including proportionality. IDF officers
emphasized that the decision to employ artillery fire is not based
merely on the unavailability of air assets but rather on the particular
characteristics of the artillery in the attendant circumstances; it can
often be the superior military choice of means because of its speed,
flexibility, and persistence.
IDF officers were quick to point out that the requirement to take
precautions in attack is subject to the condition of feasibility.
Feasible measures are those that are “practicable or practically
possible, taking into account all circumstances prevailing at the
time, including humanitarian and military considerations.”211 In
some cases, feasibility may be an issue of asset availability, as in the
case of RPAs. MAG officers also accentuated the fact that the
capability to engage in precautions in attack is always context
specific. For instance, in order to engage a fleeting target it may be
necessary to task aircraft that are presently airborne. Those aircrafts
may not be armed with the optimal weapons to avoid collateral
damage, but if it would not be militarily feasible to task another
platform against the target the airborne aircraft may engage so long
as the rule of proportionality is satisfied. Human intelligence is
211 CIHL Study, supra note 75, at 54. See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Reservation b, June 8 1977, ICRC Treaty,
available
at
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?action=
openDocument&documentId=D9E6B6264D7723C3C12563CD002D6CE4
(
statements on “feasibility” made by the United Kingdom at the time of accession to
AP I); Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps
and Other Devices, art. 3(4), Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168 (defining ‘feasible
precautions’ as quoted in text); Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices art. 3(10), May 3, 1996, 2048
U.N.T.S. 93 [hereinafter Amended Mines Protocol] (defining ‘feasible precautions’
further by listing examples of circumstances that should be included in the
determination of feasibility); ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 204, at ¶ 2198
(explaining the adoption of the words “feasible precautions”).
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another contextual asset that affects feasibility. In an area such as
the West Bank where the IDF presently operates, it is more likely to
have human intelligence sources that can verify a target than in
Gaza, from which Israeli forces withdrew in 2005. Of course,
feasibility may be determined by factors as simple as foul weather
that blinds certain on-board sensors of an RPA or other aircraft or
interferes with the guidance of particular categories of weapons.
What distinguishes IDF precautions in attack is their approach
to warnings.212 Additional Protocol I, Article 57(2)(c), provides that
“effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may
affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not
permit.”213 As should be apparent from the discussion above, the
IDF takes exceptional measures to warn the civilian population of
attacks that may affect them. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine more
robust warnings during an armed conflict. However, it is essential
to distinguish Israel’s practice in this regard from its legal
obligations.
Israel takes the position that the requirement for warnings is
customary in nature. In its view, said warnings need only be
effective in the sense of being communicated to civilians who may
be affected by an attack and being delivered in a manner that
permits those civilians to take measures to avoid harm.
Effectiveness is not evaluated by how many civilians actually
heeded the warning, but rather by whether or not the civilian
population had sufficient opportunity to protect itself against
impending attacks. When multiple types of warning are possible,
there is no requirement that any particular means be employed
provided that the one selected meets the threshold of effectiveness.
Nor is there any requirement that all feasible means of warning
civilians be employed, that redundant means be used to ensure
notification, that civilians be re-warned in the event they ignore a
warning, or that the attacker set forth the means of finding safety
(e.g., by designating no-fire areas to which the civilians should
move).
212 See Pnina Sharvit Baruch & Noam Neuman, Warning Civilians Prior to Attack
under International Law: Theory and Practice, 87 INT’L L. STUD. 361, 361 (2011)
(exhibiting the views of a former and the present head of the IDF International Law
Department on warnings).
213 NWP 1-14, supra note 115, at 8.9.2. (requiring warnings in advance of
bombardment “when the military situation permits.”); CIHL Study, supra note 75,
at r. 20.
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The MAGs interviewed stressed, correctly so, that a warning
need not be issued when circumstances do not permit, as when a
warning may heighten the risk to the attacker or forfeit the element
of surprise.214 In certain situations, the IDF has chosen not to warn
on this basis. This is most often the case when targeting a particular
individual because a warning would allow him to escape. As a
practical matter then, this means that warnings of a strike on a
building are usually only issued when the building itself is a target
based on its use or purpose. MAG officers stressed that although a
warning might not be issued in advance of a strike targeting an
individual in a building, the attack would be fully subject to the rule
of proportionality and the other precautions in attack requirements.
Additionally, if feasible, civilians who might be affected in adjacent
buildings will be warned.
Circumstances may allow for a warning, but not permit much
time for the civilian population to leave. This situation will typically
arise when the enemy is using the warnings to either know when
and where to use human shields or take measures to prevent the
civilians there from leaving. Such practices may leave only a narrow
window of opportunity to strike before the number of individuals
likely to be harmed in the attack rises. Therefore, a strike soon after
a warning may in certain circumstances be the best means for
minimizing civilian injury even when it does not afford civilians a
great deal of time to leave or take shelter.
The Israeli practice of roof knocking described earlier has been
criticized by human rights groups and during investigations of
Israeli practices, most notably in the controversial Goldstone
Report.215 Roof knocking has been characterized as increasing the
risk to the civilians being warned and as an attack on a civilian
object. These criticisms are counter-factual and counter-normative.
First, the technique is only used when warnings have been issued
and ignored or were infeasible to begin with. In such circumstances,
the target is already subject to attack at the time the roof knocking
occur; thus, if the civilians leave based on the technique, risk to them
will have been dramatically reduced. As to the second point, the
214 CIHL Study, supra note 75, at Commentary to r. 20; ICRC COMMENTARY,
supra note 204, at ¶ 2223.
215 See Goldstone Report, supra note 69, at ¶¶ 532–535. See also Laurie Blank,
The Application of IHL in the Goldstone Report: a Critical Commentary, 12 Y.B INT’L
HUMANITARIAN L. 347 (2009) (criticizing how the Goldstone Report applied the
LOAC).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

136

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 37:1

technique is only used when the building has been converted into a
military objective through use (such as weapons storage). The intent
is to motivate civilians remaining in the lawful target to depart.
Overall, the susceptibility of Israel to offensive lawfare by its
enemies drives the IDF into taking precautions in attack that far
exceed those required by the LOAC. Indeed, the Chairman of the
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff recently sent a “lessons learned” team to
Israel to examine measures the IDF takes to limit collateral damage
during operations in urban areas.216 In this regard, the Authors
would hasten to add that many of those taken by Israel are based on
policy, not the strictures of the LOAC. Therefore, before adopting
such measures, the United States and other States would be well
advised to carefully consider whether the same policy concerns
animate operations in which they are involved.
6. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The central finding of this project is that the unique Israeli
operational context described in Part I exerts an almost tyrannical
influence over the IDF’s legal organization and Israel’s
understanding and application of the LOAC. The driving forces in
this context are 1) the risk of direct attack faced by the Israeli civilian
population due to geography and enemy strategy and 2) the
extremely high value Israel places on the safety of its soldiers.
Israel’s enemies clearly understand the extent to which these two
factors loom large for Israel and exploit them to offset the qualitative
and technical advantages that Israel enjoys in conventional warfare.
They do this by directly targeting the Israeli population, seeking to
capture individual Israeli soldiers and engaging in lawfare tactics.
IDF operations are clearly well-regulated and subject to the rule
of law. The IDF has extremely robust systems of examination and
investigation of operational incidents, and there is significant
civilian oversight, both by the Attorney General and the Supreme
Court. With respect to the MAG Corps, the Authors found its
officers to be exceptionally competent, highly professional, and
well-trained. The extent to which MAG officers are independent of
216 David Alexander, Israel Tried to Limit Civilian Casualties in Gaza: U.S. Military
Chief, REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/ 06/usisrael-usa-gaza-idUSKBN0IQ2LH20141106.
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commanders, especially when providing legal advice during
ongoing operations, is striking. For instance, the fact that the MAG
officers report up the legal, rather than operational, chain of
command deviates from the practice of many other countries that
engage regularly in combat, including the United States. In the view
of the Authors, the Israeli system generates both positive and
negative consequences. It fosters compliance with the law through
MAG Corps possession of a “red card” vis-à-vis individual strikes
and the concentration of investigative and prosecutorial authority in
the Military Advocate General. However, the system sacrifices the
intangible, but very real, relationship between Commanders and
their judge advocates that results from being a member of the
Commander’s team. This relationship is, in the personal experience
of the Authors, a key factor in securing the Commander’s
recognition that the law can serve as an enabler of broader
operational and strategic objectives, rather than an obstacle to
mission accomplishment.
Despite the difference in approach, the Israeli system is arguably
better suited to the unique operational and strategic context in
which Israel operates. In particular, because the IDF fights enemies
who intentionally employ lawfare as a tactic and strategy, it has to
be extremely cautious when conducting a strike that might be
exploited. In such an environment, it is sensible to grant legal
advisors greater authority than they might otherwise enjoy in a
more traditional combat environment.
The operational context in which Israel finds itself also drives
the IDF's approach to targeting. Given the geography of Israel and
the multiple potential enemies it faces, centralizing air targeting and
decentralizing ground attacks makes sense.
Moreover, the
operational tempo of the operations merits close legal supervision,
which the Operational Law Apparatus is designed to provide. It is
clear that the deliberate targeting cycle process employed by the
Israeli Air Force is constructed so as to identify legal issues as they
crop up and to facilitate compliance with LOAC as operations are
being planned, approved and executed. Doing so is, as discussed,
essential to countering the specific tactics employed by Israel's
opponents.
The need for caution in the face of such enemy tactics caused
the Authors surprise with respect to ground targeting. In particular,
the Authors found it curious that the IDF does not place legal
advisers into the individual Attack Cells. Dynamic targeting, such
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as that conducted in the cells, can prove highly problematic because
the situation is often murky and unfolds rapidly. During
preplanned targeting, by contrast, there is more time to consider a
legally problematic situation and seek advice. It would seem that a
MAG officer in the targeting cells would be no less valuable than
those serving in the OLA for deliberate air targeting. Although the
Authors found the confidence displayed by IDF ground
commanders in their own ability to apply the LOAC and the rules
of engagement impressive, they were concerned that this
confidence, if not properly channeled and monitored by legal
advisers, could become counterproductive.
In terms of the law, there were no findings that would mark
Israel as an outlier with respect to any particular norm. On the
contrary, in most cases Israel’s legal position on its customary law
obligations is in accord with the targeting laws set forth in
Additional Protocol I, as the Parties thereto typically interpret them.
On a number of issues, Israel takes a different approach than
Additional Protocol I parties, but none of its stances is unique; in
most cases other non-Parties to the Additional Protocol, such as the
United States, share them. It is especially noteworthy that the IDF
now applies the notion of organized armed groups as a basis for
targeting, apparently on the ground that the Supreme Court's
approach in the Targeting Killing case is ill suited to the
contemporary operational context. Israel’s rejection of the notion of
continuous combat function likewise demonstrates the IDF’s
sensitivity to the truism that the LOAC must be understood in, and
responsive to, the context in which it is applied.
Although the Israeli positions on the LOAC principles and rules
governing targeting are rather orthodox, the unique operational
environment in which Israel finds itself clearly affects interpretation
and application. As an example, given the propensity of Israel’s
enemies to use human shields, it is unsurprising that Israel has taken
the position that individuals voluntarily acting in this manner are to
be treated as direct participants in hostilities. In light of its enemies’
frequent failure to distinguish itself from the civilian population, it
is equally unsurprising that Israel has embraced the principle of
reasonableness with respect to target identification. Perhaps most
noteworthy is the high value Israel places on the safety of its soldiers
and its civilian population. Although impossible to quantify, both
Authors were convinced these concerns significantly influenced the
value judgments made by Israeli commanders as they plan and

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss1/3

2015]

TYRANNY OF CONTEXT

139

execute military operations, value judgments that often come into
play in the application of such LOAC concepts as proportionality.
In the Authors’ opinion, use of lawfare by Israel’s enemies
likewise shapes, whether consciously or not, Israel’s interpretation
and application of the LOAC. In particular, Israel has adopted an
inclusive approach to the entitlement to protected status,
particularly civilian status. Examples include Israel’s positions on
doubt, its treatment of involuntary shields as civilians who are not
directly participating and its view that individuals who ignore
warnings retain their civilian status. Although these positions
might seem counterintuitive for a State that faces foes who exploit
protected status for military and other gain, such positions are well
suited to counter the enemy’s reliance on lawfare. In this regard,
Israel’s LOAC interpretations actually enhance its operational and
strategic level position despite any tactical loss. Along the same
lines, in many cases, the IDF imposes policy restrictions that go
above and beyond the requirements of LOAC.
Ultimately, this first look inside Israeli targeting revealed a
system and an approach to the law that has been carefully crafted to
take account of the distinctive operational context in which Israel
finds itself, a context which drives its opponents into the adoption
of strategies and tactics that in turn influence the Israeli approach.
In other words, the operational and legal environments are highly
synergistic and evolve continuously. It remains to be seen which
elements of the system described above will survive the next war.
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